S.J. v Minister for Justice and Equality
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Judge | Clarke C.J.,MacMenamin J.,Dunne J. |
| Judgment Date | 05 February 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] IESCDET 35 |
| Date | 05 February 2018 |
[2018] IESCDET 35
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Clarke C.J.
MacMenamin J.
Dunne J.
IN THE MATTER OF THE REFUGEE ACT 1996 (AS AMENDED)
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (ELIGIBILITY FOR PROTECTION) REGULATIONS 2006
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING) ACT 2000
Judicial review – Leave to appeal – Point of general public importance – Applicant seeking leave to appeal – Whether the point raised was of general public importance
Facts: The High Court (Keane J), on the 10th October, 2017, declined to grant the applicant judicial review in relation to the decision of the first respondent, the Minister for Justice and Equality, in relation to subsidiary protection. The applicant then submitted an application for leave and notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. At the heart of the issues between the applicant and the respondents, the State, was the question of the credibility of the applicant. In that context, reference was made to a number of earlier decisions and in particular the decision in the case of MM v MJLR (No. 3) [2013] 1 IR 370. That case was of significance in the context of the point of general public importance relied on by the applicant.
Held by Clarke CJ, MacMenamin J and Dunne J that, given the reliance placed on the decision in the case of MM by the applicant and having regard to the fact that the issue in that case was very similar to the issue raised in this case, it could not be gainsaid that the point raised in this case was a point of general public importance that required leave to be granted. Given the fact that the application for leave in this case was granted by reference to the decision in the case of MM and that the decision in that case was imminent, the Court held that it followed as a matter of logic that the outcome of the decision in that case was likely to have profound implications for the outcome of the appeal in this case. The Court held that it would therefore be a matter for the case management judge to consider the course of this appeal in the light of the judgment in the MM case once it had been delivered.
Clarke CJ, MacMenamin J and Dunne J held that the Court would grant leave to the applicant to appeal from the decision of the High Court subject to the direction in relation to the case management of the case.
Application granted.
| COURT: High Court |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 10th October 2017 |
| DATE OF ORDER: 13th December 2017 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 14th December 2017 |
| THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 20th DECEMBER 2017 AND WAS IN TIME. |
The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal' direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.
Furthermore the...
To continue reading
Request your trial