Sheehan v District Justice Reilly

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1993
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 133 of 1992]
• Date: 01 January 1993

Supreme Court

[S.C. No. 133 of 1992]

Sheehan v. District Judge Reilly

Charles Sheehan

Applicant

and

District Judge Michael Reilly and The Governor of Limerick Prison

Respondents

and The Director of Public Prosecutions, Notice Party

Cases mentioned in this report:—

Conlin v. Patterson [1915] 2 I.R. 169; (1915) 49 I.L.T.R. 92.

O'Donoghue v. The Governor of Limerick Prison (Unreported, Supreme Court, 20th March, 1992).

The State (de Burca) v. O hUadhaigh [1976] I.R. 85.

The State (McDonagh) v. Frawley [1978] I.R. 131.

The State (McNally) v. O'Donovan [1974] I.R. 272.

The State (Royle) v. Kelly [1974] I.R. 259.

The State (Tynan) v. Keane [1968] I.R. 348.

Constitution - Personal rights - Liberty - Inquiry - Aggregate sentences in excess of 24 months imposed by District Court - Applicant challenging legality of detention - Whether challenge should be treated as application for inquiry pursuant to Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 2 of Constitution - Whether appropriate to treat challenge as application for judicial review - Matters to be ascertained on hearing of application for inquiry pursuant to Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 2 of Constitution - Grounds justifying challenge to legality of detention under Article 40, s. 4 of Constitution - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Article 40, s. 4, sub-ss. 1 and 2.

Judicial review - Certiorari - District Court imposing sentence in excess of jurisdiction - Sentence quashed - Matter remitted to District Court - Whether quashing of sentence quashes conviction - Whether conviction so quashed null and void ab initio - Criteria applicable to exercise of power to remit on application for judicial review - Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 (S.I. No. 15), O.84, r. 26(4).

Application for Inquiry Pursuant to Article 40.

The facts and the relevant constitutional and other provisions are summarised in the headnote and are fully set out in the judgment of Finlay C.J., post.

The appeal against the orders of the High Court (Carney J.) of the 5th February, 1992, and of the High Court (Denham J.) of the 25th March, 1992, was heard by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., Hederman, O'Flaherty, Egan and Blayney JJ.) on the 10th November, 1992

Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 2 of the Constitution provides as follows:—

"Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity for justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with law."

By virtue of O.84, r. 26(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986, where an order of certiorari is granted, the High Court may in addition remit the matter for reconsideration by the court, tribunal or authority whose decision has been quashed.

By virtue of s. 12 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984, the District Court has jurisdiction to impose aggregate sentences up to a total of two years imprisonment.

In November, 1990, the applicant was sentenced by the District Court to two terms of imprisonment, of ten months and six months respectively, to run consecutively; he began to serve those sentences in January, 1991, when an appeal to the Circuit Court was withdrawn. On the 2nd January, 1992, he was convicted in the District Court, by the first respondent, of a further offence, and a term of imprisonment of ten months was imposed, to run from the termination of the sentences already imposed.

The applicant contended that the first respondent had acted in excess of jurisdiction in imposing an aggregate sentence of more than twenty four months. In February, 1992, he sought a conditional order of habeas corpus and an inquiry in accordance with Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 2 of the Constitution. The applicant deposed on affidavit that the first respondent had been aware of the original sentences when the sentence of the 2nd January, 1992, was imposed.

The High Court did not grant the conditional order of habeas corpus or hold the inquiry sought; but granted the applicant leave to apply for an order of certiorari by way of application for judicial review in respect of the conviction and sentence imposed in January, 1992. Consequential orders were made so that the application for judicial review could be heard quickly. The High Court apparently proceeded in the erroneous belief that the original sentences had been imposed in November, 1991, rather than November, 1990.

The application to quash the order of the 2nd January, 1992, was not opposed when it was heard in March, 1992; but on the application of the notice party, the matter was remitted to the District Court, pursuant to O.84, r. 26(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986. The applicant, who did not have legal representation in the High Court, was discharged from custody.

The applicant appealed against the order granting him liberty to apply for judicial review in lieu of the relief sought; and against the order remitting the matter to the District Court.

Held by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., Hederman, O'Flaherty, Egan and Blayney JJ.), in allowing the appeal, 1, that an application which clearly raised an issue as to the legality of a person's detention must be treated as an application for an inquiry under Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 2 of the Constitution, no matter how it was described; and that such an application, in its urgency and importance, must necessarily transcend any procedural form of application, whether for judicial review or otherwise.

2. That, accordingly, the application heard in February, 1992, should have been treated as an application for an inquiry pursuant to Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 2 of the Constitution.

3. That upon the making of such an application, a judge of the High Court had a jurisdiction and a discretion to make inquiries of a speedy, and if necessary, informal nature, to ascertain the facts, even if he had not yet reached the conclusion that a sufficient doubt had been raised as to the legality of the detention to warrant calling upon the jailor or detainer of the applicant to show cause.

4. That in the instant case, at the hearing of the application in February, the High Court should have ascertained the date on which the applicant had started to serve the original sentences; whether he was still serving those sentences and, if so, the date of due release or whether, when sentence was imposed in January, 1992, he was still serving the original sentences.

5. That a person was deprived of his liberty otherwise than in accordance with law, contrary to Article 40, s. 4, sub-s. 1 of the Constitution, where there had been such a default of fundamental requirements that the detention might be said to be wanting...