Siddiqi v Medical Council of Ireland
Jurisdiction | Ireland |
Judge | Clarke C.J.,MacMenamin J.,Baker J. |
Judgment Date | 26 March 2020 |
Neutral Citation | [2020] IESCDET 48 |
Date | 26 March 2020 |
Court | Supreme Court |
Docket Number | Supreme Court record no: S:AP:IE:2019:000229 High Court record no: 2016 No. 151 SP |
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 75 OF THE MADICAL PRACTITIONERS ACT 2007
[2020] IESCDET 48
Clarke C.J.
MacMenamin J.
Baker J.
Supreme Court record no: S:AP:IE:2019:000229
Court of Appeal record no: A:AP:IE:2019:000440
High Court record no: 2016 No. 151 SP
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
RESULT: THE COURT DOES NOT GRANT LEAVE TO THE APPLICANT TO APPEAL TO THIS COURT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
REASONS GIVEN:
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
COURT: Court of Appeal |
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 3rd December, 2019 |
DATE OF ORDER: 3rd December, 2019 |
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 4th December, 2019 |
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON the 24th December, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME. |
1. This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal.
The general principles applicable by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal, having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution, as a result of the 33rd Amendment, have now been considered in a large number of determinations, and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESC DET 134, and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v. Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal”, direct from the High Court to this Court, can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of this Court in Wansboro v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESC DET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.
Furthermore, the application for leave filed, and the respondent's notice, are published, along with this determination, (subject only to any redaction required by law), and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties. In that context, it should be noted that the respondent (The Medical Council), opposes the grant of leave.
The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered aforesaid. It is important to emphasise what the Court of Appeal held in that judgment. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the court was dealing with an application to that court to extend the time to file an appeal from the High Court, in circumstances described below.
To quote from the Court of Appeal:
“On the 23rd March, 2016, the Medical Council attached certain conditions to the applicant's ongoing registration following a finding of poor professional performance in respect of certain matters by the Fitness To Practice Committee of the Medical Council. On the 13th April, 2016, the appellant appealed the decision to the High Court, pursuant to s. 75 of the Medical Practitioners Act, 2007.
The High Court delivered a written judgment on 31 May, 2019 refusing the appeal, and refusing to cancel the decision of the Medical Council. Section 77 of the Act of 2007 provides that the court may, on the hearing of an appeal under s.75(1), or an application under s.76(1), admit and have regard to the evidence of any person of good standing and a medical professional as to what constitutes professional misconduct, or poor professional performance, in relation to the practice of that profession.”
But, the Court of Appeal went on to state:
“Sub-section (2) is critical to this appeal. It provides that the decision of the court on an appeal under s.75(1), or an application under s.76(1), is final, except that the Council or the medical practitioner to whom the decision relates may...
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