Singh v Minister for Justice & Equality

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 08 October 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IEHC 707
• Date: 08 October 2019
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2017 No. 719 J.R.] [2017 No. 18 J.R.]

[2019] IEHC 707

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Richard Humphreys

[2017 No. 719 J.R.]

[2017 No. 18 J.R.]

BETWEEN

AMARDEEP SINGH, UNA KUMAR, ROWAN KUMAR (A MINOR SUING THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND UNA KUMAR)

&

MAYA KUMAR (A MINOR SUING THROUGH HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND UNA KUMAR)

APPLICANTS

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENT

BETWEEN

YUNLONG LI

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENT

(No. 2)

Leave to appeal – Judicial review – Immigration Act 2004 s. 4 – Applicants seeking leave to appeal – Whether the key issues regarding the interpretation of the Immigration Act 2004 had already been clarified at appellate level

Facts: In Singh v Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 1) [2019] IEHC 537 (Unreported, High Court, 1st July, 2019) Humphreys J dismissed the applicants’ judicial review proceedings on a number of converging grounds: (i) a challenge to a mere proposal is generally inappropriate; (ii) an applicant cannot challenge a decision on the basis of a point not actually made; (iii) insofar as the applications related to the Immigration Act 2004, they were misconceived; (iv) insofar as the applications related to a process outside the 2004 Act, the applicants were not as yet disadvantaged; (v) he would have refused the application in Li on discretionary grounds had it not failed on the merits; and (vi) as regards discrimination or arbitrary application of the 2004 Act, inadequate evidence of such discrimination or arbitrary operation had been presented, but even if it had been that would not have given rise to an entitlement to the relief sought in the proceedings. The applicants sought leave to appeal. They raised various inventive questions regarding s. 4 of the 2004 Act. In oral submissions they limited themselves to the first question relating to the 2004 Act proposed in their written submissions.

Held by Humphreys J that the key issues regarding the interpretation of the 2004 Act had already been clarified at appellate level as set out in the substantive judgment, so there was no point in granting leave to appeal in this case. He held that the various judgments at appellate level discussed in the No. 1 judgment, while perhaps not addressing the question as so worded expressly, had the logical consequence that a person who at some period in the past had a s. 4 permission which had expired for more than a de minimis period could not seek to rely on s. 4...