Smith v Cisco Systems Internetworking (Ireland) Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Meenan
• Judgment Date: 13 November 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] IEHC 714
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2018 No. 210 MCA]

IN THE MATTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1998

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE EQUALITY ACT 2004

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 2015

BETWEEN

OLUMIDE SMITH

APPELLANT

AND

CISCO SYSTEMS INTERNETWORKING [IRELAND] LIMITED

RESPONDENT

[2020] IEHC 714

Meenan

[2018 No. 210 MCA]

THE HIGH COURT

Discrimination – Fair procedures – Points of law – Appellant appealing against a decision of the Labour Court – Whether the appellant was discriminated against and victimised on grounds of race in matters of remuneration and promotion

Facts: The appellant, Mr Smith, appealed to the High Court against a decision of the Labour Court of 26 April 2018. That decision arose out of an appeal by the appellant from a decision of an Adjudication Officer under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (the Acts). The Adjudication Officer had held that the appellant’s former employer, the respondent, Cisco Systems Internetworking (Ireland) Ltd, had not discriminated against him on grounds of race in relation to pay and other matters including dismissal and promotion. The Adjudication Officer had decided that a number of complaints of discrimination on the race ground had not been made within the time period specified in the Acts and, thus, were out of time. The Labour Court found that the appellant was not discriminated against on grounds of race. Thus, the decision of the Adjudication Officer was affirmed. On the “preliminary issue”, the appellant submitted, inter alia: “(a) The Labour Court disproportionately failed to apply fair procedures and consequently erred in the determination of the preliminary issue pursuant to s. 77(5)(a) and s. 77(5)(b) of the Acts 1998 to 2011. North Thames Regional Health Authority v. Noone West [1988] ICR 813 at 822. (b) The Labour Court disproportionately failed to apply a fair procedure and in this regard failed or refused to consider the precise fact or law in relation to the reasonable cause requirement which I submitted and in this regard, the Labour Court disproportionately erred on its failure to document the precise reason I submitted in relation to my application for extension of time…” The appellant stated: “The Labour Court disproportionately erred and misdirected itself in what it called cognisable period which the Labour Court erroneously established as 29 May 2013 to 28 November 2013 instead of 3 January 2013 to 2 July 2013...” and “The Labour Court failed to apply fair procedures and in this regard erred in the interpretation of the law and consequently failed to extend its so called cognisable period to the prior 12 months, say 12 months, from the date of the last incident i.e. the Labour Court failed to use the period 03 July 2012 to 02 July 2013 as its said cognisable period...”

Held by Meenan J that the appellant had identified no point of law indicating an error on the part of the Labour Court. Meenan J held that the appellant, in his submission to the High Court, other than disagreeing with the determination of the Labour Court, had identified no basis upon which the High Court could interfere with the findings of the Labour Court on the various complaints made. Meenan J held that the appellant had identified no facts as would suggest that the findings of the Labour Court were irrational or unreasonable. By reason of the foregoing, Meenan J was satisfied that the appellant had identified no points of law as would permit the High Court to uphold his appeal.

Meenan J dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Meenan delivered on the 13th day of November, 2020

Introduction

1 This is an appeal brought by the appellant against a decision of the Labour Court of 26 April 2018. This decision arose out of an appeal by the appellant from a decision of an Adjudication Officer under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (the Acts). The Adjudication Officer had held that the appellant's former employer, the respondent, had not discriminated against him on grounds of race in relation to pay and other matters including dismissal and promotion. The Adjudication Officer had decided that a number of complaints of discrimination on the race ground had not been made within the time period specified in the Acts and, thus, were out of time.

2 The appellant was employed by the respondent at its Galway Office in January, 2008. The respondent is a multinational technology company which designs, builds and manufactures networking systems. The appellant was dismissed on 5 July 2013 and paid in lieu of notice.

3 The appellant appeared in person before this Court, the Adjudication Officer and the Labour Court.

4 Section 90(1) of the Acts provides: -

“Where a determination is made by the Labour Court on an appeal under this Part, either of the parties may appeal to the High Court on a point of law.”

The first matter which I will address is the jurisdiction of the Court in hearing an appeal on a point of law.

Appeal on a Point of Law

5 The limitation on this Court's jurisdiction in hearing an appeal on a point of law has been considered in a number of authorities, which I will now refer to. Firstly, in Mara (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hummingbird Limited [1982] I.L.R.M. 421, Kenny J. in the Supreme Court stated: -

“…findings on primary facts should not be set aside by the Courts unless there was no evidence whatever to support them. The Commissioner then goes on in the Case Stated to give his conclusions or inferences from these primary facts. These are mixed questions of fact and law and the Court should approach these in a different way. If they are based on the interpretation of documents, the Court should reverse them if they are incorrect, for it is in as good a position to determine the meaning of documents as is the Commissioner. If the conclusions from the primary facts are ones which no reasonable Commissioner could draw, the Court should set aside its findings on the ground that he must be assumed to have misdirected himself as to the law or made a mistake in reasoning. Finally, if his conclusions show that he has adopted a wrong view of the law, they should be set aside. If, however, they are not based on a mistaken view of the law or a wrong interpretation of documents, they should not be set aside unless the inferences which he made from the primary facts were ones that no reasonable Commissioner could draw.”

6 More recently, McKechnie J., in the High Court decision in Deely v. Information Commissioner [2001] 3 I.R. 439 which concerned an appeal under s. 42 of the Freedom of Information Act, which also limited an appeal to a point of law only, summarised the principles which apply on such an appeal as follows: -

“… There is no doubt but that when a court is considering only a point of law, whether by way of a restricted appeal or via a case stated, the distinction in my view being irrelevant, it is, in accordance with established principles, confined as to its remit, in the manner following :-

(a) it cannot set aside findings of primary fact unless there is no evidence to support such findings;

(b) it ought not to set aside inferences drawn from such facts unless such inferences were ones which no reasonable decision making body could draw;

(c) it can, however, reverse such inferences, if the same were based on the interpretation of documents and should do so if incorrect; and finally;

(d) if the conclusion reached by such bodies shows that they have taken an erroneous view of the law, then that also is a ground for setting aside the resulting decision…”

7 It is entirely clear from the authorities that an appeal on a point of law is not a de novo appeal. The circumstances under which the court, on an appeal limited to a point of law, may interfere with findings of fact is clearly limited.

The Appellant's Case

8 As mentioned, the appellant represented himself and was the author of his own supporting documentation. A consideration of this documentation indicated that the appellant was not confining his appeal to a point of law. The originating Notice of Motion set out, at considerable length, numerous references to various statutory provisions without stating the relevance of such, or in what way the Labour Court was in breach of same in reaching its determination. Unfortunately, the appellant's grounding affidavit did not advance matters.

9 When the appeal first came on for hearing before this Court on 19 November 2019, having considered the voluminous documentation and the submissions of the appellant, I directed that the appellant identify, in precise summary form, the points of law which he was relying upon for the purposes of his appeal. The appellant complied with this direction and furnished a document dated 3 December 2019. I will refer to this...