Stapleton v St Colman's (Claremorris) Credit Union Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Max Barrett
• Judgment Date: 31 July 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] IEHC 510
• Docket Number: Record No: 2014/7369P
• Court: High Court
• Date: 31 July 2015

[2015] IEHC 510

THE HIGH COURT

Barrett J.

Record No: 2014/7369P

BETWEEN:

KAREN STAPLETON

Plaintiff

-AND-

ST COLMAN'S (CLAREMORRIS) CREDIT UNION LIMITED

Defendant

Employment – Personal injury – Personal Injuries Assessment Board – S. 2 of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991 – Lapse of time

Facts: Following the institution of the personal injuries action by the plaintiff against the defendant to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board for vilification of the good name of the plaintiff, the defendant now came to the Court seeking the dismissal of the said action on the ground that it was outside the statutory limitation of time.

Mr. Justice Max Barrett granted an order to the defendant for the dismissal of the subject proceedings. The Court held that the time limit to initiate an action for personal injury within two years of the occurrence of injuries was legislated for the common good so that the aggrieved party should get the redressal of his grievances at the earliest and such purpose should not be befitted. The Court found that the plaintiff had the knowledge since inception of bringing the claim under the prescribed time and she out of her own volition did not choose to do so and thus, the time limit could not be extended.

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Max Barrett delivered on 31st July, 2015.

PART I

KEY ISSUE ARISING

1 Should the within personal injuries proceedings be struck-out as statute-barred under the statute of limitations legislation?

PART II

BACKGROUND FACTS

2 On or about 19th June, 2011, Ms Stapleton was out at a social occasion when she was advised that an allegation, it seems of workplace bullying, had been made against her by a co-worker at the defendant credit union. Thereafter Ms Stapleton appears to have been considerably unhappy at work due to what she perceived to be an ongoing and unresolved vilification of her good name. In the end, Ms Stapleton's worries seem to have got the better of her, with the result that between February and September 2012, she was absent from work on stress-related sick leave for a considerable portion of time. She was eventually dismissed from her employment on 18th September, 2012.

3 A claim brought by Ms Stapleton under the unfair dismissals legislation in respect of her dismissal met with success in January of this year before the Employment Appeals Tribunal and Ms Stapleton's reinstatement to work was ordered.

4 Separately, in March 2014, Ms Stapleton had set about the process of seeking relief for personal injuries that she claims to have suffered at the hands of the credit union, its officers, servants or agents. She made application to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB); this application was received on 24th March, 2014, and an authorisation to bring the within proceedings issued from that Board on 26th March, 2014. Notably, this was 2 years and 8 months after Ms Stapleton first attended with her medical doctor for treatment of alleged work-related stress, and 2 years and 1 month after she was diagnosed with a significant related ailment.

PART III

PRINCIPAL CONTENTIONS OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES

5 The credit union comes to court complaining that Ms Stapleton's proceedings were commenced out of time. It points to the fact that Ms Stapleton has pleaded in her personal injury summons, the contents of which have been verified on affidavit, that the alleged workplace vilification commenced against her in or about June 2011, and that she was caused to attend with her medical doctor for treatment of work-related stress on or about 22nd August, 2011. She was certified as unfit to work due to stress-related illness on 1st February 2012, returned to work for March 2012, and thereafter was absent until September 2012, at all times due to work-related stress. This being so, the credit union contends that there is no doubt that Ms Stapleton knew, at the latest by 1st February, 2012, that she had been injured, that the injury in question was significant, that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the impugned acts or omissions of her employer, its officers, servants or agents, whether in conducting or allowing the purported campaign of vilification. Consequently the...