Steele v Belfast Corporation

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 03 November 1920
• Date: 03 November 1920
• Docket Number: (1918. No. 6214.)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)

K. B. Div.

Appeal.

(1918. No. 6214.)

Steele v. Corporation of Belfast.

STEELE

and

BELFAST CORPORATION

Negligence - Tramcar - Signal to start car given by passenger - Liability of defendants - Duty of counsel on settlement of questions for july.

New Trial Motion.

This was an action brought against the defendants to recover damages from the Belfast Corporation as owners of the tramway system for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Margaret Jane Steele, while in the act of mounting a tramcar of the defendants at Mountpottinger corner, in the City of Belfast.

The tramway system of Belfast is owned and worked by the corporation as a municipal undertaking; the places for the cars to stop for the purpose of allowing members of the public to enter or alight are indicated by posts, the shorter, described as

red stops, being compulsory stopping places for cars which have not already their full complement of passengers, and the others indicating particular places on the route at which the car will stop by request of any person desiring to enter or leave it.

Upon the occasion in question, Saturday, September 28th, 1918, a car had started for the city from the suburbs at an hour not definitely fixed, but apparently at or about 10.30 p.m. This car reached Cromac Street, where there is a red stop, and the conductor being apparently engaged at the moment collecting fares inside the car, a passenger re-started the car, giving the appropriate signal to the driver by pulling the conductor's bell from the rear platform of the car. The same thing happened subsequently at Short Strand, another red stop, the conductor on this occasion being engaged in collecting fares from passengers on the top of the car. Again at Woodstock, a request stop, the car pulled up, whether at the request of some one entering or leaving the car does not appear, and it was re-started by a passenger, there being no evidence as to the whereabouts of the conductor on this occasion. Upon its further journey it reached Mountpottinger, a red stop, and here there were five intending passengers awaiting its arrival. At this time there were three passengers standing on the rear platform, and as one of the five persons, Caroline Legg, attempted to enter the car, she had to give way to a passenger who was leaving it. Another of the five, the plaintiff, Mrs. Steele, then proceeded to enter the car, holding the upright bar in her hand; but just as she had placed her feet upon the step below the platform, one of the three passengers upon it rang the conductor's starting-bell, and the driver put the car in motion, with the result that Mrs. Steele lost her balance and Was thrown from the car, being dragged along the ground for some distance, notwithstanding the efforts of her husband and others to hold her up. As a consequence she sustained serious injuries, the nature and extent of which are irrelevant to the question to be decided. It was proved that the conductor at the time the car stopped and this accident happened was on the top of the car personally collecting the fares.

The questions put to the jury and the answers thereto were as follows: 1. Was the conductor negligent in not being himself on the platform at a red stop? Yes. 2. Was the conductor negligent in permitting the bell to be under the control of a passenger on the platform? Yes. 3. Was the conductor negligent in not anticipating that a passenger on the platform might precipitately ring the bell? Yes. 4. Was the driver of the car negligent in starting the tram notwithstanding that the bell had rung? No. 5. Were the defendants negligent in not taking reasonable precautions to provide a safe access to a tramcar to a person invited to enter it as a passenger, and, if so, what reasonable precaution did they omit? Yes, in so far that the car had not an efficient conductor. 6. If so, was it by reason of such negligence that the accident occurred? Yes. 7. Were the injuries caused by the negligence of the plaintiff? No. 8. Damages? £550. After the jury had returned the foregoing verdict, the learned Judge put to them four supplementary questions, which, with the answers, were: 1. Did they on this occasion provide a reasonably safe access? No. 2. Did they provide a reasonably safe access? No. 3. Did they invite the plaintiff to enter? Yes. 4. Was it by reason of their not providing such access that the plaintiff suffered the injuries complained of? Yes.

The learned Judge (Dodd J.) gave judgment for the plaintiff for £550 and costs.

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal (1).

18, 20, 30 June 3 Nov.

In an action for negligence the evidence for the plaintiff was to the effect that, while a tramcar was at a standstill at a compulsory stopping place, indicated by a red signal-post, the plaintiff proceeded to enter, but, as she had put her foot on the step, a passenger on the platform rang the conductor's starting bell, and the driver put the tram in motion, with the result that the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and sustained serious injuries; that during all this time the conductor was on the top of the car collecting fares; and that during the earlier part of the same journey the bell had been rung by passengers on at least three occasions.

At the trial the defendants' counsel called no evidence, and asked for a direction. The jury found for the plaintiff.

Held, by the King's Bench Division (1), that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. Held also, that it was not open to the defendants' counsel to rely on any defects in the questions to which he had not drawn the Judge's attention at the trial.

The decision of the King's Bench Division on the main question affirmed by the Court of Appeal (2)

Per Sir J. Campbell C.: Where, at the close of the plaintiff's case, counsel for the defendant asks for a direction which is refused, and does not go into evidence, he has no responsibility for the form or sufficiency of the questions submitted to the jury, and is in no way estopped from questioning or criticizing them in any subsequent proceedings. The duty of Judge and counsel in relation to the framing of questions for the jury stated.

Molony C.J. :—

This action has been brought against the defendants to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while in the act of mounting a tramcar of the defendants at Mountpottinger corner, in the City of Belfast. In Belfast, as in Dublin, there are certain places where the tram stops by request, and certain other places where all trams stop, and which are denoted by a red sign on the foot way, and are called "red stops." Mountpottinger corner is one of the places at which every tram stops.

On the night of the 28th of September, at a quarter to 11 o'clock, the plaintiff and her husband were standing at Mountpottinger corner waiting for the arrival of the tram. It came up and stopped in the usual manner. When the car stopped there were some three or four passengers on the platform, and there were give persons waiting to get on the car, which was not crowded. One passenger had got off, and the plaintiff had mounted the step of the tram; but she had only one foot on the step when one of the persons on the platform rang the bell, and the tram went off, with the result that, although tile plaintiff's husband tried to hold her up, he failed to do so, and she was thrown to the ground and sustained serious injuries. All this time the conductor was on the top of the tram, and he did not come down until after the accident had occurred and another passenger had pulled the bell to stop the car, or, as it was put by Caroline Legg, "he came from the top after all was over."

In this state of facts it is sought to make the defendants liable on the ground that the conductor was negligent in not being on the platform at the red stop, where it was reasonable to expect that passengers would be getting on and off, and where it was his admitted duty to start the car. On the other hand, it is alleged that the accident was entirely caused by the independent action of a third person, for which the defendants can in no way be held liable.

The principle governing a case of this character was exhaustively considered by this Court and by the Court of Appeal in the case of Sullivan v. Creed(1); and the effect of all the decisions is thus summed up by FitzGibbon L.J. at page 339: "Where an injury has been suffered which would not have happened but for the action of more than...