Stokes v The South Dublin County Council

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Robert Eagar
• Judgment Date: 08 March 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IEHC 149
• Docket Number: [RECORD NO. 2018/349JR]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 08 March 2019

BETWEEN

JOHN STOKES, TAMMY STOKES, JOHN STOKES JR (A MINOR SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TAMMY STOKES), MICHAEL STOKES (A MINOR SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TAMMY STOKES) THOMAS STOKES (A MINOR SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TAMMY STOKES)

APPLICANTS

AND

THE SOUTH DUBLIN COUNTY COUNCIL

AND

THE MINISTER FOR HOUSING, PLANNING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

RESPONDENTS

AND

IRELAND

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

AND

THE IRISH HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY COMMISSION

NOTICE PARTIES

[2019] IEHC 149

[RECORD NO. 2018/349JR]

THE HIGH COURT

Costs – Moot proceedings – Judicial review – Applicants seeking costs – Whether the response of the respondent to the issue of judicial review proceedings rendered the legal proceedings moot

Facts: The applicants, Messrs and Ms Stokes, sought leave to apply for a number of motions but in particular: (i) an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the first respondent, the South Dublin County Council, of the 12th February 2018 to refuse to process the applicants’ caravan loan; (ii) an order directing the Council to process the applicants’ caravan loan; and (iii) a declaration by way of an application for judicial review that the refusal of the Council of the 12th February 2018 was (a) an obligation of the Council’s statutory discretion pursuant to s. 25 of the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act 1998 and was for that reason ultra vires, unlawful, void, and of no effect, (b) an unlawful fettering of statutory discretion pursuant to s. 25 of the 1998 Act, (c) an unlawful resigning from the legitimate expectation created by the Council’s previous representations to the applicants, upon which the applicants had relied, (d) based on an error of law and was for that reason ultra vires and (e) unreasonable by law by reason of being arbitrarily determined by the fact that the applicants reside within the functional area of the Council, a housing authority which was not processing caravan loans under s. 25 of the 1998 Act or otherwise. The matter came before Noonan J on the 30th April 2018. He ordered that the applicants did have leave by way of application for judicial review for the reliefs set forth and that the applicants serve an originating notice of motion before 1:00 p.m. on the 1st May 2018 returnable for the 8th May 2018 in the judicial review list together with copies of the aforesaid statement and verifying affidavit and the order and the solicitors on behalf of the respondents and notice parties. On the 22nd October 2018 it was indicated to the High Court that the only issue before the court was the matter of costs.

Held by Eagar J that the response of the Council to the issue of judicial review proceedings was an event that ultimately rendered the legal proceedings moot.

Eagar J held that the applicants were entitled to the costs of the ex parte application for judicial review.

Costs awarded.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Robert Eagar delivered on the 8th day of March 2019

1 This is a judgement on foot of an ex parte application for leave to apply by way of an application for judicial review which have become moot. The only issue now before the court is costs.

2 On the 20th day of April, 2018, on foot of an application by the applicants made ex parte for leave to apply by way of an application for judicial review for a number of motions but in particular: -

(i) an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the first named respondent of the 12th February 2018 to refuse to process the applicants' caravan loan;

(ii) an order directing the first named respondent to process the applicants' caravan loan;

(iii) a declaration by way of an application for judicial review that the refusal of the first named respondent of the 12th February 2018 was:-

(a) an obligation of the first named respondents' statutory discretion pursuant to s. 25 of the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act 1998 and was for that reason ultra vires, unlawful, void, and of no effect;

(b) an unlawful fettering of statutory discretion pursuant to s. 25 of the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act 1998;

(c) an unlawful resigning from the legitimate expectation created by the first named respondents' previous representations to the applicants, upon which the applicants had relied;

(d) based on and error of law and was for that reason ultra vires;

(e) unreasonable by law by reason of being arbitrarily determined by the fact that the applicants reside within the functional area of the first named respondent, a housing authority which is not processing caravan loans under s. 25 of the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act 1998 or otherwise.

3 A number of other declarations were sought by the statement grounding the application for judicial review, but for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary to set them out in full.

4 The matter came before Noonan J. on the 30th April 2018 and he ordered that the applicants do have to leave by way of application for judicial review for the reliefs set forth and that the said applicants serve an originating notice of motion before 1:00 p.m. on the 1st May 2018 returnable for the 8th May 2018 in the judicial review list together with copies of the aforesaid statement and verifying affidavit and this order and the solicitors on behalf of the respondents and notice...