Superwood Holdings Plc v Sun Alliance & London Insurance Plc
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judgment Date | 01 January 1999 |
| Neutral Citation | [1998] IESC 15 |
| Date | 01 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | [S.C. No. 126 of 1998] |
| Court | Supreme Court |
[1998] IESC 15
THE SUPREME COURT
Hamilton C.J.
O'Flaherty J.
Murphy J.
BETWEEN:
and
and
Synopsis
Practice and Procedure
Fire; compensation; insurance; alleged fraud; assessment of damages; lodgment; settlement of appellant companies claims in so far as they relate to the fourth named respondent; application for extension of time for acceptance of lodgment; whether Supreme Court should entertain an appeal against orders made by a trial judge during the course of hearing an action; whether proceedings between the appellants and the fourth named respondents have been finally determined; O. 22, r. 12, Rules of the Superior Courts Held : Appeal allowed (Supreme Court : Hamilton CJ., O'Flaherty J., Murphy J. 21/07/1998) - [1999] 4 IR 531
Superwood Holdings PLC v. Sun Alliance
Order 22, rule 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts does not apply to this application and only applies where money is paid into Court by one or more several defendants jointly or in the alternative, is accepted on the basis that all further proceedings in the action or in respect of the specified cause or causes of action (as the case may be) shall be stayed, and the Court is in a position to deal with the whole costs of the action, there being no question of the action continuing against the remaining defendants. The Supreme Court so held in allowing the appeal and saying that while it does not approve of appeals taken in the course of a hearing the facts of the present case indicate that the claim has been finally settled against the fourth respondent which entitles the Court to hear this appeal and further that there is no rule of law which requires nor do the interests of justice require that the Court should impede this settlement of a portion of what are quite protracted proceedings.
JUDGMENT of the Chief Justice delivered on the 21st day of July 1998.[NEM DISS]
This is an appeal brought by the above named Appellants against the judgment of the High Court, Smyth J., delivered on the 15th day of May 1998 and the order of the High Court made in pursuance thereof dismissing the application made on behalf of the Plaintiffs for an order extending the time for acceptance of a lodgment made in these proceedings by the fourth named Respondent in the little hereof (hereinafter referred to as Lloyds).
The background to this case is set fourth in detail in the judgement Mrs. Justice Denham delivered on the 27th day of June 1995 and as stated by her:-
"The case arises as a result of a fire on the Plaintiff premises after which they sought to recover compensation under polices of insurance for indemnity for consequential loss. The Defendants repudiated the contracts on the grounds of fraud. Thereafter, this case took on an enormous momentum of its own, including the not infrequent hallmarks of a "fraud" case involving as it did a lengthy hearing, a mountain of paperwork, and a collection of circumstantial evidence."
The case was at hearing for 116 days before the High Court the Judgement runs to 423 pages and the transcripts of that trial alone number in excess of 8,500 pages. The High Court dismissed the Plaintiffs action, and the Plaintiffs appealed to this Court where the hearing of the appeal lasted 16 days.
By order dated the 27th day of June 1995, this Court allowed the appeal brought by the Appellants herein and ordered that the judgement and order of the High Court be set aside.
The Supreme Court further ordered that the matter be remitted to the High Court determine what were the Plaintiff's losses arising after the fire at their premises at Bray on the 26th day of October 1987 and what percentage of these losses were attributable to the fire and such other matters as are relevant and in issue.
It is now necessary to set forth in detail the proceedings in the High Court subsequent to the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court.
By notice of motion dated the 13th day of June 1996, the Appellants herein applied to the High Court for directions and the first, second and third named Respondents by notice of motion dated 10the day of July 1996 sought liberty from the Court to deal directly with the receiver of the Plaintiff Companies.
These two motions were heard in the High Court and by order dated the 16th day of July 1996 the High Court adjourned the motion brought by the first, second and third named Respondents, generally with liberty to re-enter and on the motion brought by the Appellants herein it was ordered:-
(1) that the loss suffered by the Plaintiffs arising out of the fire at their premises at Bray on the 26th day of October 1987 be determined by reference to the statement of claim delivered on the 24th day of November 1988 so as to determine the amounts payable to the Plaintiffs under the terms of the insurance policies, the subject matter of these proceedings;
(2) that on determination of the losses set out in the said Statement of Claim the Court do determine what percentage of the losses are attributable to the fire;
(3) that the issues referred to at (1) and (2) above should be placed in the list to fix dates on Thursday, 25th July with priority;
(4) that immediately upon the determination of the said issues set out in (1) and (2) above or as soon as practicable thereafter the Court do determine what further damages the Plaintiffs are entitled to pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court dated 27th day of June 1995;
(5) that the parties hereto be at liberty to seek further and better discovery in due course in respect of the issues set out at paragraph (4) hereof notwithstanding that discovery of documents relating to the issues set at paragraph (1) hereof is complete.
The next relevant step taken in the High Court was that by notice of motion dated 25th October 1996, the first, second and third named Respondents applied to the High Court pursuant to the provisions of Order 22 Rule 1(a) of the Rules of the Superior Courts to lodge in court a sum of money in satisfaction of the Appellants claim herein.
By order dated the 12th day of November 1996, the High Court (Smyth J.) ordered that the first, second and third named Defendants be at liberty to lodge in court a sum of money against all claims of all the Plaintiffs so however that the elements of the lodgment are indicated by reference to paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of the order of the High Court dated the 16th day of July 1996 and subject to the conditions therein set fourth.
The said order granted leave to the fourth named Defendant to lodge, if so advised, on identical terms of the first, second and third named Defendants.
The Appellants herein appealed to this Court against the terms of the said order of the High Court made on the 12th day of November 1996 which said appeal was dismissed by this Court on the basis that the trial judge was in charge of the case and this Court would not interfere with his discretion in such matter and the order of the High Court was varied by adding three days to each of the dates specified in the said order in relation to such lodgment and to acceptances thereof.
In pursuance of the said order the first, second and third named Respondents lodged in court the sum therein set fourth by reference to paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) as required by the High Court order dated the 16th July 1996.
On the19th day of November 1996, the fourth named Defendant paid into court a sum of money and by letter of that date specified that the breakdown of the money lodged in Court in respect of issues (1) (2) and (4) of the Order of the High Court dated the 16th July 1996.
It appears from a letter written by the trial judge on the 18th of November 1996 that he directed the trial of an issued raised by the fourth named Respondent herein on the 12th November 1996 which issue was stated to be that:-
"That the trial when began proceed on the basis of the evidence adduced at the original trial before O'Hanlon J. and that no new evidence be permitted to be adduced on the assessment of damages as are referred to in the order of the President of the High Court of the 26th June 1996, in particular paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) thereof."
This matter came before the Court on the 19th November 1996 and it was ordered that the Plaintiffs (Appellants herein) do issue and serve on the Defendants (Respondents herein) on or before Friday, 22nd day of November, 1996 a notice of motion was to be returnable for the 25th November 1996.
On the 25th November 1996, the High Court found that the parties hereto are not estopped from adducing further and/or new evidence in relation to the assessment of damages to be here in and ordered that:-
" the assessment of damages to be had herein pursuant to the said order of the Supreme Court dated the 27th day of June 1995 be heard by way of a retrial - the Court"
(i) having regard to the findings of fact made by Mr. Justice O'Hanlon as summarised at pages 16 to 19 inclusive in the judgement of Mrs. Justice Denham and
(ii) abiding by the said order of the Supreme Court."
Further orders were made by the High Court (Smyth J.) on the 10th day and the 11th of December 1996.
In pursuance of the order made by Smyth J. on the 25th November 1996 the Appellants leave to adduce further and fresh...
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