T.O. (Nigeria) v The Minister for Justice and Equality

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 18 April 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] IEHC 256
• Docket Number: [2011 No. 834 J.R.]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 18 April 2018

BETWEEN

T.O. (NIGERIA)

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, IRELAND

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

[2018] IEHC 256

[2011 No. 834 J.R.]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Asylum, Immigration & Nationality – Refusal of subsidiary protection – Issuance of deportation order – Judicial review

Facts: The applicant challenged both the decisions of the first named respondent ('Minister'), which were the refusal of subsidiary protection and the issuance of the deportation order made against the applicant. The applicant argued that he should have been afforded an oral hearing and that the Minister did not consider the country of origin information.

Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys dismissed the applicant's application. The Court held that the applicant did not request an oral hearing before the Minister and thus, now, he was precluded from raising that issue before the Court. The Court observed that the decision- maker had considered the relevant information and made appropriate observation that the internal relocation was a viable option for the applicant.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 18th day of April, 2018

1 The applicant entered the State in December, 2008 and applied for asylum. That was refused in September, 2009. On 20th October, 2010 the applicant applied for subsidiary protection and leave to remain. The subsidiary protection application was refused in April, 2011. That decision was reissued in May, 2011. A deportation order was made in July, 2011.

2 I have received helpful submissions for Mr. Paul O'Shea B.L. for the applicant and Ms. Fiona O'Sullivan B.L. for the respondent.

Reliefs and grounds

3 What is before the court is a challenge to both the subsidiary protection refusal and the deportation order.

4 Ms. O'Sullivan makes a formal objection to my having allowed amendments at the leave stage but it seems to me those amendments are allowable for the reasons stated in P.C.N. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (Unreported, High Court, 18th April, 2018).

5 The purely legal points advanced by Mr. O'Shea have already been rejected by me in N.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IEHC 186 [2018] 2 JIC 2710 (Unreported, High Court, 27th February, 2018) and F.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (Unreported, High Court, 17th April, 2018) and I follow those decisions here. That leaves the fact-specific points in relation to the subsidiary protection refusal and the deportation order.

6 The relevant grounds as far as the subsidiary protection application are concerned are:

(i). ground 6, the failure to have regard to representations made,

(ii). ground 8 that the representations were read selectively and were irrationally dealt with,

(iii). ground 9 that the representations were not considered and nor was past persecution in the context of the qualification directive ( Council Directive 2004/83/EC) and

(iv). ground 13 that the country of origin information was insufficient, was read selectively and was not made available for the applicant until after the decision.

7 Grounds 6 and 8 are also advanced in relation to the deportation order, which perhaps illustrates the entirely generalised and boilerplate nature of the pleadings.

8 It seems to me that these boilerplate pleadings are part of a series of similar cases where identical grounds have been manufactured in a mass-produced fashion. In circumstances such as those, I am not prepared to allow such grounds to be reprogrammed after the event into case-specific complaints where no particulars whatsoever of the complaint are specified in the grounds as pleaded. That does not necessarily mean that no general ground in any judicial review whatsoever is permissible but it means that the court should not be treated as a conveyor belt with a series of virtually identical, unfocused, generalised complaints with no particularisation, turned out in case after case without attention being given to the fact-specific issues at the time at which leave is sought. If I am wrong about my view that relief should not be granted on the basis of pleadings such as these, I will go on to deal with the specific complaints.

Fact-specific points regarding subsidiary protection

9 It is suggested that the conclusion that protection would be available to the applicant did not flow from the country of origin information. It seems to me that conclusion did so flow, particularly given the general nature of the submissions made.

10 The suggestion that information was...