The King (O'Reilly) v Justices of Fermanagh

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 18 May 1903
• Date: 18 May 1903
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)

The King (O'Reilly)

and

Justices of Fermanagh (1).

Appeal.

CASES

DETERMINED BY

THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION

OF

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN IRELAND,

AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM IN

THE COURT OF APPEAL,

AND BY

THE COURT FOR CROWN CASES RESERVED.

1904.

Loan Fund Society — Promissory note — Statute of Limitations — Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 93), sect. 10, sub-sect. 4 — 6 & 7 Vict. c, 91 — 63 & 64 Vict. c. 25.

Proceedings by the treasurer of a loan society to recover the amount of promissory notes made for the repayment of loans under the Loan Societies (Ireland) Act,1843, are subject to the provisions of sect. 10, sub-sect. 4, of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, and must be brought within six months from the time when the cause of action arose.

Decision of King's Bench Division in Atthill v. Woods ([1903] 2 I. R. 305) affirmed.

Appeal by Edward O'Reilly, receiver of the Pettigo Loan Fund Society, from an order of the King's Bench, dated the 29th January, 1903, discharging a conditional order for certiorari obtained by O'Reilly to quash orders made by the Justices dismissing summonses brought by O'Reilly to recover sums due on certain promissory notes. There were forty-one summonses brought before the Justices on the 28th October, 1902, and the magistrates refused to give decrees on the ground that a copy of the rules of the Loan Fund in question had not been lodged with the clerk of Petty Sessions, pursuant to section 14 of the Loan Funds Societies Act, 1843. This point was not argued in the King's Bench, but the question argued there was as to whether the six months' limitation in section 10, sub-section 4, of the Petty Sessions Act, 1851, applies to promissory notes issued by Loan Fund Societies. The King's Bench held that the debts were barred on the ground that the summonses were not issued until more than six months after the promissory notes sued on became due, under section 10 (4) of the Petty Sessions Act, 1851. In this

the King's Bench followed their decision in Atthill v. Woods (1). Edward O'Reilly appealed against that order. The respondent Hugh Martin was the only one of the defendants who showed cause against the conditional order being made absolute in the King's Bench. The note on which he was sued was for £3, dated the 6th June, 1896, while the summons was issued on the 31st May, 1902.

Campbell (Solicitor-General), O'Connor, K.C, and Pringle, for the appellant:—

The Petty Sessions Act does not apply to a Loan Fund note. Proceedings can be taken for recovery of the amount due on one of these notes, notwithstanding that a period of six months has elapsed: Rex v. Justices of Fermanagh (2).

The Charitable Loan Societies Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 91), is a code, and provides exclusive jurisdiction for this form of debt: Moore v. Donagher (3); Armstrong v. Orr (4). The Act 63 & 64 Vict. c. 25, was passed to cure certain defects with respect to notes of Loan Fund Societies. A note current or unpaid on the 1st March, 1899, could be enforced, notwithstanding the lapse of time, within six months after the passing of the Act, otherwise the Act would be inoperative.

Horner and Henry, K.C., for the respondent:—

The sole remedy of the plaintiff was by complaint before the Justices under section 30 of the Charitable Loan Societies Act, 1843: Moore v. Donagher (3). The Petty Sessions Act, 1851, is therefore to be read along with the Act of 1843. Section 3 of the Charitable Loan Societies Act, 1900, incorporates the Petty Sessions Act, 1851, as to forms and costs. The mode of service prescribed by section 30 of the Act of 1843, and by section 12 of the Petty Sessions Act, is the same.

Section 10, sub-sect. 4, of the Petty Sessions Act, 1851, is an amplification of the corresponding sections in the earlier repealed Acts, namely (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, and 12 & 13 Vict. c. 70,

s. 11), in which the time limit for all summary complaints was six months from the date upon which the complaint arose. See also the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 92, sects. 1 and 44); and the Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 13.

[They cited Fiddes v. Mohan (1); Rex (Maxwell) v. Justices of Fermanagh (2); Atthill v. Woods (3); Enniskillen Loan Fund Society v. Green (4); Harpin v. Sykes (5); Morant v. Taylor (6); Tottenham Local Board v. Rowell (7); West v. Downman (8); Vestry of Hammersmith v. Lowenfeld (9); Stone's Justice's Manual, 36, 354.]

Campbell [Solicitor-General), O'Connor, K.C., and Pringle, for the appellant:—

Horner and Henry, K.C., for the respondent:—

Lord Ashbourne, C.:—

This case comes before us on appeal from the King's Bench Division, and is, we are told, important, as its decision may possibly involve grave consequences to the Loan Fund Board, who may have many other cases involving the same question.

The question raised is short and simple, and comes to this, whether the limitation of time imposed by section 10, sub-sect. 4, of the Petty Sessions Act, 1851, applies to proceedings under section 30 of the Charitable Loan Societies Act, 1843. That sub-section is as follows:—

“In all cases of summary jurisdiction the complaint shall he made when it shall relate to the non-payment of any poor rate, county rate, or other...