Thompson v Tesco (Irl) Ltd & Minister for Enterprise
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr.Justice Vivian Lavan |
| Judgment Date | 07 June 2002 |
| Neutral Citation | [2002] IEHC 63 |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 07 June 2002 |
[2002] IEHC 63
THE HIGH COURT
BETWEEN:
AND
Citations:
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S2
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S3
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S21(4)
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S3(1)
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S3(2)
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S3(4)
NATHAN V BAILEY GIBSON LTD 1998 2 IR 162
DENNY & SONS (IRL) LTD V MIN FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 1998 1 IR 34
FAULKNER V MIN FOR INDUSTRY & COMMERCE UNREP MURPHY 25.6.1993 1993/11/3511
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S21
O'KEEFE V BORD PLEANALA 1992 ILRM 237
Synopsis:
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Equality
Discrimination - Whether claim of indirect discrimination established - Whether decision of Labour Court wrong in law - Employment Equality Act, 1977 (2001/235sp - Lavan J - 7/6/2002)
Thompson v Tesco Ireland
Facts: The appellant worked as a sales assistant and sought to have her working hours amended to suit child minding arrangements. The request was refused and the appellant, a lone parent, claimed that similar requests were favourably received from men and married women. The appellant, through her trade union, referred a claim to the Labour Court claiming discrimination against her contrary to ss. 2 and 3, of the Employment Equality Act, 1977. Both the Equality Officer and the Labour Court rejected the appellant’s complaint of unlawful sex discrimination. The appellant appealed to the High Court on the basis that the Labour Court in reaching its decision did not apply the relevant legal principles to the facts presented before it, and that it erred in particular in misapplying the law relating to indirect discrimination.
Held by Lavan J in dismissing the appeal. The main issue was whether the appellant had established a prima facie case of indirect discrimination. The appellant adduced no evidence as to how the practice of working late bore significantly more heavily on single mothers availing of child minding facilities than on single men availing of same. Therefore, the appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. It was well settled law that, where a quasi judicial function was delegated to an expert administrative tribunal, the decision of such a tribunal could not be challenged on the grounds of irrationality if there was any relevant material to support it. In the instant case, the Labour Court acknowledged that while the fact that the appellant’s request for shorter working hours was not acceded to might amount to unfairness in an industrial relations sense, it could not avail her complaint of discrimination. The employer was entitled, owing to sound non-discriminatory business reasons, to refuse such requests, and was found to have done so on a non-discriminatory basis. All findings of fact were sustainable based on the relevant material before the Labour Court.
Mr.Justice Vivian Lavan delivered the 7th day of June, 2002.
The current proceedings amount to an appeal against a determination of the Labour Court. In its decision, the Labour Court rejected the appellant's complaint of unlawful sex discrimination in the workplace contrary to the prevailing statutory provisions.
The appellant is a sales assistant in the employment of the first named respondent. In July, 1996, she had applied to have her working hours amended to accommodate child minding arrangements. This request had been refused by the branch management. The appellant, a lone parent, claims that similar requests were favourably received from men and married women.
The appellant, through her trade union, referred a claim to the Labour Court claiming discrimination against her contrary to ss. 2 and 3, Employment Equality Act, 1977. The Labour Court referred the claim to an Equality Officer for hearing. On 20th May, 1999, the Equality Officer in a Recommendation dismissed the said complaint. The Equality Officer's Recommendation was appealed to the Labour Court by the appellant herein. By a determination dated the 27th March, 2001, the Labour Court disallowed the appeal and upheld the Equality Officer's Recommendation. The appellant now seeks to bring an appeal against such determination on foot of s. 21 (4), Employment Equality Act, 1977.
Section 21 (4) provides that:
"A party to a dispute determined by the [Labour] Court … may appeal to the High Court on a point of law".
The relevant provisions of the Employment Equality Act, 1977, are as follows:
Section 2
"For the purposes of this Act, discrimination shall be taken to occur in any of the following cases -"
(a) where by reason of his sex a person is treated less favourably than a person of the other sex,
(b) where because of his marital status a person is treated less favourably than another person of the same sex,
(c) where because of his sex or marital status a person is obliged to comply with a requirement relating to employment … which is not an essential requirement for such employment … and in respect of which the proportion of persons of the other sex or (as the case may be) of a different marital status but of the same sex able to comply is substantially higher, …
Section 3 of the same Act provides that:
2 "(1) A person who is an employer or who obtains under a contract with another person the services of employees of that person shall not discriminate against an employee or a prospective employee or an employee of that other person in relation to access to employment, conditions of employment (other than remuneration or any condition relating to an occupational pension scheme), training or experience for or in relation to employment, promotion or re-grading in employment or classification of posts in employment.
(2) An employer shall not, in relation to his employees or to employment by him, have rules or instructions which would discriminate against an employee or class of employee, and shall not otherwise apply or operate a practice which results or would be likely to result in an act which is a contravention of any provision of this Act when taken in conjunction with Section 2 (c)…
…
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a person shall be taken to discriminate against an employee or prospective employee in relation to conditions of employment if he does not offer or afford to a person or class of persons the same terms of employment (other than remuneration or any term relating to an occupational pension scheme), the same working conditions and the same treatment in relation to overtime, shift work, short time, transfers, lay-offs, redundancies, dismissals (other than a dismissal referred to in section 25) and disciplinary measures as he offers or affords to another person or class of persons where the circumstances in which both such persons or classes are or would be employed are not materially different…".
The principal claim of the appellant in the present case is that the Labour Court in reaching its decision did not apply the...
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