Tracey v O'Donnell and the DPP
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice John MacMenamin |
| Judgment Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] IESC 19 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | [APPEAL NO. 173/2008] |
| Date | 30 April 2020 |
AND
[2020] IESC 19
MacMenamin J.
Dunne J.
Charleton J.
[APPEAL NO. 173/2008]
THE SUPREME COURT
Judicial review – Conviction – Driving without due care and attention – Appellant seeking judicial review – Whether the respondent had wrongly refused to adjourn the case in circumstances where the appellant had previously applied to the prosecution authorities for statements of the evidence intended to be given
Facts: The appellant, Mr Tracey, was prosecuted in the District Court before the first respondent, a District judge, on a charge by then reduced to that of driving without due care and attention contrary to s. 52(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961. He was convicted of the offence and fined the sum of €400, together with witness expenses of €200 in default. He sought to quash that order. He submitted that: (a) the first respondent had wrongly refused to adjourn the case in circumstances where the appellant had previously applied to the prosecution authorities for statements of the evidence intended to be given (a “Gary Doyle” application); (b) the first respondent had refused to dismiss the case on the grounds that there was a six-month time limit on the making of a complaint which had been exceeded; (c) there had been insufficient evidence for any conviction; and (d) hearsay evidence had unlawfully been admitted. In a written High Court judgment dated the 6th March, 2008, the appellant was refused judicial review. He appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgment and order of the High Court.
Held by the Court that, in refusing to grant an adjournment, the first respondent was acting in an area of judicial discretion where, absent a finding of constitutional unfairness, a court will be slow to intervene. The Court held that there was nothing to indicate that the first respondent exercised his discretion other than in a judicial manner in the circumstances. The Court held that the High Court judge correctly ruled that there was nothing to suggest that the summons had been issued out of time (ss.10 and 12 of the Petty Sessions Act 1851, superseded by s. 1 of the Courts No. 3 Act 1986, and Tracey v District Judge Malone and Ors. (Supreme Court Appeal No. 262/2009). The Court held that, in appellate procedures, insufficiency of evidence might well be a ground for reversing a decision of a court of first instance; but, save in the most extreme circumstances, insufficiency of evidence will not deprive a District judge of jurisdiction to reach a decision on the matter before him or her (Roche v District Judge Martin [1993] I.L.R.M. 651 and Graham v Racing Board (Unreported, High Court, 22nd November 1983)). The Court held that this was not such a case.
The Court held that the appeal would be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
This is an appeal against a judgment and order of McGovern J. in the High Court ( [2008] IEHC 60). In a written judgment dated the 6 th March, 2008, the appellant was refused judicial review.
The appellant’s application arose from a prosecution against him in the District Court before the first-named respondent on a charge by then reduced to that of driving without due care and attention contrary to s.52(l) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961. The appellant was convicted of the offence and fined the sum of €400, together with witness expenses of €200 in default. The appellant sought to quash that order. The appellant appeared on his own behalf in the District Court and subsequently. He has, however, some considerable experience in conducting his own cases.
In the High Court judgment, McGovern J. addressed a number of issues which the appellant argued warranted the granting of judicial review. The appellant submitted that (a) the first-named respondent had wrongly refused to adjourn the case in circumstances where the appellant had previously applied to the prosecution authorities for statements of the evidence intended to be given; that is, a “Gary Doyle” application; (b) the first-named respondent had refused to dismiss the case on the grounds that there was a six-month time limit on the making of a complaint which had been exceeded; (c) there had been insufficient evidence for any conviction; and (d) hearsay evidence had unlawfully been admitted.
Several points may be made clear at the outset. First, the High Court is not a court of appeal from the District Court. In a judicial review application where an order of certiorari is sought in relation to a District Court order, a court conducting such a review will give consideration as to whether that discretionary remedy - as opposed to appeal - is actually necessary in the particular case under consideration. Judicial review is not to be viewed simply as an alternative avenue of appeal. In general, judicial review concerns, rather, questions going to the jurisdiction of a court.
Second, questions of sufficiency of evidence are generally matters for appeal. The long-established jurisprudence on these questions is outlined toward the conclusion of this judgment.
Third, it is necessary to recognise that, in the administration of justice, there are areas where judges are entitled to exercise their discretion so as to ensure that the ends of justice are achieved. In considering whether to grant judicial review, a court may, on occasion, be asked to assess whether a District judge exercised his or her discretion fairly. It must be remembered that an area of discretion is one where, within the boundaries of the Constitution and the law, a District judge may have to carry out a balancing exercise between the interests of one party or another and the interests of justice itself. Absent clear unfairness, a review court will be slow to intervene.
Fourth, the primary aim in any District Court proceeding is that justice be fairly administered in that court. This can impose duties on parties before the Court as well as the judge to seek to ensure a court does not err in law or fall into unconstitutionality. Judicial review must not be seen as being some objective or end in itself.
Finally, judicial review is a remedy which will require expedition in the interest of either or both parties, and in the interest of justice itself. Judicial review applications, and decisions and appeals therefrom, should not be permitted to linger or wither from neglect or studied indifference. In judicial review as in other areas of law, justice delayed is justice denied. These are of course general observations, but to a greater or lesser extent may have a bearing on whether, in a given case, the discretionary remedy of review should be granted. The issues raised by the appellant are now dealt with in sequence. He has provided a written record of what transpired in the District Court which is of considerable assistance.
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Kevin Tracey v District Judge Tom O'Donnell and DPP
...Court. In a written judgment dated the 6th March, 2008, the appellant was refused judicial review. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed ([2020] IESC 19). The appellant submitted he was entitled to a sum of €9,019 by way of his costs and outlay. He drew the Court’s attention to the length of......