E.A.O. v Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul and Others

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeKearns P.
Judgment Date13 February 2015
Neutral Citation[2015] IEHC 68
CourtHigh Court
Date13 February 2015

[2015] IEHC 68

THE HIGH COURT

[No. 10479P/2013]
O (EA) v Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul & Ors

BETWEEN:

E.A.O.
PLAINTIFF

AND

THE DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY OF ST VINCENT DE PAUL

AND

THE SISTERS OF CHARITY REFUGE

AND

THE HEALTH SERVICE EXECUTIVE
DEFENDANTS

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 1957 S71

ADOPTION ACT 1952 S14

ADOPTION ACT 1952 S15(1)

RAINSFORD v LIMERICK CORPORATION 1995 2 ILRM 561

PRIMOR PLC v STOKES KENNEDY CROWLEY 1996 2 IR 459

O'DOMHNAILL v MERRICK 1984 1 IR 151

TOAL v DUIGNAN (NO.1) 1991 ILRM 135

COMCAST INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC v MIN FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISE & ORS UNREP SUPREME 17.10.2012 2012/7/1702 2012 IESC 50

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Dismissal of proceedings

Application for dismissal for want of prosecution - Personal injury proceedings arising from adoption of child - Alleged undue influence and duress - Inordinate and inexcusable delay - Whether claim statute-barred and bound to fail - Postponement of limitation period in cases of fraud - Whether consent to adoption invalid - Fraud - Documents made available through data protection request - Alleged concealment of legislative breach in relation to consent - Whether clock stopped by concealment - Knowledge of plaintiff - O'Domhnaill v Merrick [1984] 1 IR 151; Toal v Duignan (No 1) [1991] ILRM 135; Primor plc v Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 IR 459 and Rainsford v Limerick Corporation [1995] 2 ILRM 561 considered - Statute of Limitations 1957 (No 6), s 71 - Adoption Act 1952 (No 25), ss 14 and 15 - Claim dismissed (2013/10479P - Kearns P - 13/2/2015) [2015] IEHC 68

EAO v The Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul

Facts The plaintiff was born in 1947. At the age of six she was placed in various institutions. In 1968 she was placed in High Park, Drumcondra. Whilst absent from the institution for a time, she was raped and subsequently became pregnant. As a result, she was placed in a mother and baby home known as St Patricks, managed and operated by the first defendant. She gave birth and was immediately separated from her son. She was only allowed to see him for the purposes of feeding him and she was precluded from developing any natural relationship with him. He was put up for adoption in July 1969; she was not afforded any opportunity to say goodbye. She returned to the institution of the second defendant in Drumcondra and worked in the Magdalene laundries. She was presented with adoption papers and told if she failed to sign, she would be put out on the street. She contends she signed the documents under undue influence and duress. She subsequently left the institution and went on to marry and have seven other children. A medical report of Dr Mairead O'Leary was submitted to the court. She noted how the plaintiff was subjected to very harsh conditions, with no freedom. She was physically abused and frightened. She now feels deeply ashamed. She tried to locate her son but discovered he had passed away in 2004. The plaintiff sought to rely on s.71 Statute of Limitations (Postponement of limitation period) and s.15 of the Adoption Act 1952 (Consents to adoption). It was submitted that the consent given was not valid as the 6 month requirement had not been fulfilled and was therefore in violation of s.15. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted information was concealed from the plaintiff and consequently s.71 became operative. The court had to consider whether delay was inordinate and inexcusable. The onus lay with the party who was seeking to dismiss the claim. It was submitted, even if the court found the delay to be inordinate; it was excusable on the basis that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with recurrent depressive disorder. The court retained an inherent jurisdiction to allow a claim to proceed by applying a balance of justice test.

Held The court said it was not its function at this stage to offer any view on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. The first matter the court had to consider was whether or not the plaintiffs claim was barred by operation of the Statute of Limitations 1957. The judge said it was some forty-four years after the events complained of and was therefore prima facie statute-barred. The court was satisfied that an informal process operated and that the plaintiff was asked to consent to the adoption of her child. The court held the plaintiff, who was an adult at the time, was made fully aware of all matters and therefore there was no indication that the first defendant perpetrated a fraud or fraudulently concealed anything from the plaintiff. The judge said as so much time had elapsed from the time the events occurred and as various persons who would have been in a position to provide important evidence were now either deceased or likely to have a limited recollection of events, had it been required to do so, the Court would have dismissed the claim on the balance of justice having regard to the first defendant's inability to defend the proceedings.

- The claim was commenced out of time and therefore statute-barred. Plaintiffs claim dismissed.

1

JUDGMENT of Kearns P. delivered on 13th day of February, 2015

2

By notice of motion the first named defendant seeks an order pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court dismissing the plaintiff's claim for want of prosecution on the grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay. The first defendant further asserts that the plaintiff's claim is bound to fail by reason of having been instituted outside the time limit for doing so as set out in the Statute of Limitations Act 1957 (as amended).

BACKGROUND
3

The plaintiff was bom in 1947 and from the age of six years old was placed in the care of various institutions and industrial schools. In or about June 1968 the plaintiff was in the care of an institution operated by the second defendant located at High Park, Drumcondra when, while absent from the institution for a time, she was raped by a person unknown and became pregnant. Upon discovering that she was pregnant, the plaintiff contends that she was sent to reside at a so-called 'mother and baby home' known as St. Patrick's on the Navan Road, Dublin 7. The plaintiff submits that this institution was managed and operated by the first defendant, a religious order.

4

On the 2 nd March 1969 the plaintiff gave birth to a son at St. James' Hospital (formerly St. Kevin's) and shortly thereafter returned to St. Patrick's. The plaintiff alleges that she was separated from her son and was only allowed to see him for the purposes of feeding. She claims that she was precluded from bonding with her son or developing any natural relationship with him. In or about May 1969 the plaintiff contends that the servants or agents of the first named defendant informed her that her son was being put up for adoption. While the plaintiff maintains she strongly expressed her desire to keep her son, she states that he was taken away from her at the beginning of July 1969 and she was not afforded an opportunity to say goodbye. Documents received following a request pursuant to the Data Protection Act after the plaintiff's claim had been commenced indicate that the plaintiff signed various relevant consent documents on the 5 th May, 1969 and the 1 st October, 1969.

5

The plaintiff subsequently returned to the care of the second defendant in Drumcondra and continued working in the 'Magdalene laundries'. Some months later, the plaintiff submits that she was presented with adoption papers and was informed by a Sister Columba that should she fail to sign them she would be "put out on the street". She states that due to the undue influence and duress she was placed under, she felt compelled to sign the documents. Subsequently, the plaintiff left the institution in Drumcondra and went on to marry and have seven other children.

6

The plaintiff's Statement of Claim refers to a medical report prepared by Dr. Mairead O'Leary, consultant psychiatrist, which states that the plaintiff was institutionalised in very harsh environments throughout her life until she was approximately twenty two years old and has limited insight into how appalling her life was. She had no freedom, was physically abused and frightened, and was forced to work very hard for no remuneration. It is submitted that the plaintiff feels deeply ashamed and embarrassed by the adoption of her first son and thinks about him regularly. Some time during 2008 the plaintiff, with the assistance of one of her children, set about trying to locate her son. She subsequently discovered that he had passed away in 2004.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
7

At the time of the institution of the plaintiff's claim, the relevant limitation period for a personal injury action was six years. This has since been reduced to two years by the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004.

8

The plaintiff relies on section 71 of the Statute of Limitations 1957 (as amended) ('the Statute'). Section 71 relates to the postponement of a limitation period inn cases of fraud and provides as follows -

9

2 "71.-(1) Where, in the case of an action for which a period of limitation is fixed by this Act, either-

10

(a) the action is based on the fraud of the Defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims or his agent, or

11

(b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the Plaintiff has discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.

12

Also of relevance to these proceedings is the Adoption Act 1952 ('the Act'). Section 14 of the Act deals with consents to adoption -

13

2 "14.-(1) An adoption order shall not be made without the consent of every person being the child's mother or guardian or having charge of or control over the child, unless the Board dispenses with any such consent in...

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1 cases
  • O'Dwyer v Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul and Others
    • Ireland
    • Court of Appeal (Ireland)
    • 21 October 2015
    ...claims against the first respondent on the grounds that they were statute-barred and also by reason of inordinate and inexcusable delay ([2015] IEHC 68). The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against this decision while also seeking to adduce new evidence on this appeal. She claimed......

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