William Jones v Coolmore Stud
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Ms. Justice Donnelly |
| Judgment Date | 27 April 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] IECA 116 |
| Docket Number | 2019/446 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Ireland) |
| Date | 27 April 2020 |
[2020] IECA 116
Donnelly J.
Faherty J.
Haughton J.
2019/446
COURT OF APPEAL
Defamation – Damages – Cause of action – Appellant appealing from a decision striking out his claim – Whether the appellant’s claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous and vexatious
Facts: The appellant, Mr Jones, issued proceedings on the 12th March, 2018. He claimed damages for defamation contained in letters sent to various booksellers. He issued a motion for judgment in default of defence on the 25th January, 2019. Two weeks later, the respondent, Coolmore Stud, issued its motion seeking to have the action dismissed. On the 1st October, 2019, Allen J delivered his judgment, striking out the appellant’s claim on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous and vexatious ([2019] IEHC 652). The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Allen J. The core issues in the appeal from the appellant’s perspective were as follows: (a) he said that many of the facts were contested by him and the case law prohibits a court from dismissing a case as bound to fail in those circumstances; (b) issue was taken with the finding that although there was no res judicata or Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, there was an attempt to relitigate the 2016 proceedings; (c) issue was taken with the finding that there was no malice in law; (d) the findings of the motion judge that the 2017 letter was written with the object of having the sale and distribution of the book suppressed was exactly the type of improper conduct that is prohibited according to the definition of malice in Black’s Law Dictionary; (e) it was submitted that it was significant that the trial judge made no finding that the letter was written on an occasion of qualified privilege; (f) it was incorrect to say that the appellant’s object in bringing these proceedings was to seek to revive and relitigate issues which had been finally and conclusively decided against him; (g) the respondent was statute barred from commencing any defamation proceedings.
Held by Donnelly J that the trial judge was correct in his finding that the appellant’s claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous and vexatious.
Donnelly J held that the appeal would be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
This is an appeal from a decision of Allen J. striking out the appellant's claim on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and is frivolous and vexatious (see Jones v. Coolmore Stud [2019] IEHC 652). An understanding of the issues in this appeal requires reference to the salient history of the parties' relationship and previous litigation.
The appellant is a former employee of the respondent. The respondent owns and operates a commercial thoroughbred breeding and racing business from a stud farm in Co. Tipperary. Having been in employment with the respondent for about nine years, the appellant made a complaint to the Labour Relations Commission about his employment. On the 12 th December 2014, the claim was compromised and the terms of compromise were reduced to writing (hereinafter, “the agreement”). Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the appellant retired in January 2015 and he received from the respondent the sum of €30,000 as a gesture of appreciation, in consideration of which he agreed inter alia not to disclose any records relating to animals or clients and not to make any derogatory comments about the respondent in the future.
On the 23 rd November, 2015, the appellant self-published his book: “The Black Horse Inside Coolmore” (hereinafter, “the book”). The respondent alleged and the High Court found in earlier proceedings brought by the appellant (hereinafter, “the 2016 proceedings”), that the book is in manifest breach of the terms of the agreement. The appellant has never disputed this basic fact but in the 2016 proceedings, he claimed a type of duress in entering into the agreement.
Following the publication of the book, the respondent (through its solicitors) wrote to various booksellers and distributors asserting that the book contained material which was defamatory of the respondent, its clients, customers, owners and staff. These letters (hereinafter, “the 2015 letters”) also expressed the view that the book breached the terms of the agreement, breached the respondent's intellectual property rights and was in breach of copyright, and called on the distributors and booksellers to withdraw the book from sale. Failure to do as requested, the respondent would hold the recipients liable for any damage suffered by sales of the book.
In his 2016 proceedings, the appellant sought injunctions preventing the respondent or its representatives from threatening any bookshops or websites with legal action for defamation relating to the book and compelling the respondent and its representatives to withdraw immediately all threats of legal action made previously. The plenary summons also sought a declaration that the book was not defamatory on its face and may be sold where books are sold. A claim for evidence that the book was defamatory was also made.
The appellant's application for interlocutory injunctive relief in similar terms to that claimed in the plenary summons was refused. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal determined that the respondent was entitled to write to third parties complaining that the appellant's book was defamatory; was in breach of the appellant's contractual obligations and infringed the respondent's intellectual property rights and right to threaten to sue the third party should they see fit to publish the appellant's book.
In refusing relief in the High Court, Costello J. held inter alia that the defendant was perfectly entitled to write the 2015 letters. In doing so, Costello J. held that these “were not improper letters to write” and that the “right to send such a letter is inherent in the. right of access to the courts”
In dismissing the appellant's appeal, the Court of Appeal (Ryan P.) held inter alia that it was implicit in the defence of innocent dissemination under s. 27 of the Defamation Act, 2009 “that a person who apprehends that a publication may contain defamatory material about him is entitled to communicate that to the distributor or seller or other person involved who is not the author, editor or publisher.” Ryan P. concluded that that “there is no valid objection in law to a person seeking to protect his good name by notifying a distributor or other secondary disseminator of his complaint of defamation with a view to preventing distribution”.
On the 24 th November, 2017, the appellant's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. In its determination, the Supreme Court observed that court time is “a precious resource” and not one “to be used as a platform or a vehicle for ventilating personal grievances”.
No further steps were taken in the 2016 proceedings.
On the 30 th November, 2017, the respondent (through its solicitors) wrote to Gardner's Books Ltd (hereinafter, “Gardner's”), in similar terms to the 2015 letters. The material parts of the letter of the 30 th November, 2017 (hereinafter, “the 2017 letter”) are set out at paragraph 23 of the judgment of Allen J. and need not be repeated here. The 2017 letter again expressed the view that the book breached the terms of the agreement, was in breach of copyright and in breach of the respondent's intellectual property rights. The 2017 letter gave links to the judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal in the 2016 proceedings. The 2017 letter was sent by post to Gardner's and to three email addresses in Gardner's concerned with sales.
The appellant issued the present proceedings on the 12 th March, 2018. The claims made in the general endorsement of claim of the plenary summons are set out at paragraph 21 of the judgment of Allen J. In brief, the appellant claims damages for defamation contained in letters sent to various booksellers. In his written submissions to this Court, the appellant confirmed that the 2017 letter is his “cause of action against Coolmore Stud”.
The plenary summons also claimed injunctive relief, and on the 16 th March, 2018, the appellant sought an interim injunction on an ex parte basis. The appellant delivered his statement of claim on the 30 th April, 2018 and pressed for a delivery of a defence. The appellant subsequently withdrew his application for injunctive relief on the 14 th December, 2018, the respondent having indicated resistance to that application. During the argument on costs, each side made clear their intention to pursue further applications in the proceedings.
The appellant issued a motion for judgment in default of defence on the 25 th January, 2019. Two weeks later, the respondent issued its motion seeking to have this action dismissed.
On the 1 st October, 2019, Allen J. delivered his judgment.
Allen J. made the following relevant findings (the words in italics are direct quotes from his judgment):
(i) “In my view the decisions in the previous litigation finally and conclusively established the right of the defendant to communicate to distributors and booksellers its apprehension that the Plaintiff's book was defamatory of Coolmore and breached Coolmore's rights and the Plaintiff's obligations of confidentiality and the copyright rights of the third parties. The Plaintiff quite rightly recognises that the 2016 action came to an end when his appeal was dismissed.”
(ii) While the reliefs claimed in the 2016 proceedings are – to some extent – different to the reliefs claimed...
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...court, intended the determination of the issue to have the character of finality. That this is so is supported by Jones v Coolmore Stud [2020] IECA 116, which is a decision of particular relevance as it also concerned a situation in which the appellant sought to relitigate matters that had ......
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...it remains accessible for students and practitioners alike. 3 4 Jones v Coolmore Stud [2016] IEHC 329, [2017] IECA 164, [2019] IEHC 652, [2020] IECA 116. McDonagh v Sunday Newspapers [2017] IESC 46, [2017] 2 ILRM...