Byrne v Coroner of the County of Dublin
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | MR. JUSTICE HEDIGAN, |
| Judgment Date | 28 April 2010 |
| Neutral Citation | [2010] IEHC 154 |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 28 April 2010 |
[2010] IEHC 154
THE HIGH COURT
BETWEEN
AND
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
O'KEEFFE v BORD PLEANALA & O'BRIEN 1993 1 IR 39 1992 ILRM 237
FARRELL v AG 1998 1 IR 203
CORONERS ACT 1962 S24
CORONER
Inquest
Procedure - Fair hearing - Next of kin - Contrary evidence - Scope statutory discretion - Whether widow excluded from meaningful participation - Verdict - Death by misadventure - Cannabis secondary and contributory cause of death in medical report - Whether entitlement to rely on pathologist finding that death precipitated by cannabis use - Whether other causes of death considered - Absence of contrary evidence - Whether Coroner acting within discretion in not seeking contrary views -Deference to Coroner's opinion - O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39 applied - Farrell v Attorney General [1998] 1 IR 203 considered - Coroners Act 1962 (No 9) - Relief refused (2007/134JR - Hedigan J - 28/04/2010) [2010] IEHC 154
Byrne v Geraghty
Facts the respondent made a determination that the applicant's husband had died by misadventure, that death being contributed to by his use of cannabis, that determination being informed primarily by the pathologist's report before him. The applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the respondent on the grounds that it had been arrived it in breach of fair procedures and was irrational.
Held by Mr. Justice Hedigan in refusing the relief sought that the findings based on the pathologist's report were wholly within the parameters of relevant evidence upon which one could premise a reasonable and informed decision. It was unreasonable to expect that all contrary views be accounted for in the coroner's inquest, particularly where such contrary views had not been canvassed by the person seeking to challenge the decision. It was not within the competence of the court to examine the substantive findings in the decision but rather how the decision had been made. The respondent, in arriving at a verdict that death had been caused by misadventure, had to be satisfied that that was demonstrable on the balance of probabilities.
Farrell v. Attorney General [1998] 1 I.R. 203 applied.
Reporter: P.C.
JUDGMENT of MR. JUSTICE HEDIGAN, delivered on the 28th day of April, 2010
1. By order of Peart J. dated the 12 th day of February, 2009 the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the respondent on the following grounds:
(i) An order of certiorari quashing the respondent's determination that the applicant's husband died by misadventure;
(ii) A declaration that the Coroners Act, 1962 as it applied to the facts in question, is in contravention of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. The applicant is the widow of Paul Byrne, aged 37, who died on November 9 th, 2005. Mr Byrne had been hospitalised one month before his death due to a blood clot and was taking medication for this and several painkillers. On the afternoon of November 9 th, My Byrne complained of chest pains and dizziness. An ambulance was contacted on the advice of a local doctor, however My Byrne lost consciousness before its arrival. The ambulance arrived some 40 minutes late, and after initial resuscitation attempts brought My Byrne to Tallaght hospital, where he was pronounced dead a short time after.
3. A preliminary examination of the body was performed on the 10 th of November and a full post-mortem was performed on the 11 th of November by Dr Flavin, the pathologist. A provisional report was compiled by Dr Flavin on the 30 th of December 2005. This report concluded that death was due to acute left ventricular failure, secondary to coronary insufficiency, secondary to organising thrombus in the left anterior descending coronary artery. This was a preliminary report pending a toxicology report. The final report, upon which the coroner relied in his inquest, noted cannabis use as a secondary or contributory cause of death. The toxicology test recorded THC levels in the blood in excess of 750ng/ml and noted that "this result is interpreted as significant. Cannabis use is associated with acute cardiovascular events and facilities…". Below this comment the pathologist cited three studies, the most recent being 2005, wherein a correlation is suggested to exist between cardiovascular emergencies and cannabis usage.
4. The inquest was held on the 15 th of August 2006. The applicant was present at the inquest, and in the company of the deceased's father, Frances Byrne. The inquest concluded that the death was due to misadventure, citing the above coronary issues and cannabis use as the primary and secondary causes respectively. The applicant disputes the finding of death by misadventure and further objects to reliance on the pathologist's finding that cannabis usage precipitated the death of Mr Byrne. The applicant further claimed that due attention was not paid to her wishes at the inquest nor were other causes of death adequately considered.
5. The applicant first submits that the respondent failed to adequately address the applicant's concerns, as the deceased's wife, and further that the respondent failed to ask the applicant if she wished certain enquiries to be made. The applicant claims that she was not consulted as to whether she wished further enquiries to be made as to what role the delayed arrival of the ambulance played in Mr Byrne's death. Moreover, the applicant had expressed concerns that her husband's premature death from coronary complications could have been indicative of a genetic condition. In this regard, the applicant claims that it is imperative that the order sought be granted as the existence of a genetic predisposition to coronary diseases would affect the applicant and her children.
6. The applicant contends that the inquest was performed at "whirlwind" speeds and, moreover, in...
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