Castleisland Cattle Breeding v Minister for Social Welfare

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 07 November 2003
• Date: 07 November 2003
• Docket Number: 2001 No. 391SP
• Court: High Court

THE HIGH COURT

2001 No. 391SP

BETWEEN

CASTLEISLAND CATTLE BREEDING SOCIETY LIMITED

APPELLANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL AND FAMILY AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

Abstract:

Social welfare - Appeal - Natural and constitutional justice - Appeal from decision of social welfare appeals officer to chief appeals officer - Whether failure of chief appeals officer to allow oral hearing of appeal breach of principles of natural and constitutional justice - Error of law - Whether appeals officer erred in law or based decision on unsustainable findings of fact - Whether appeals officer failed to take into account relevant material - Whether chief appeals officer failed to independently assess appeal - Whether chief appeals officer entitled to conclude that decision of appeals officer not erroneous - Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993, sections 263 and 271.

Facts: by written agreement, the appellant engaged the services of one Michael Walsh. On an application by the said Mr. Walsh, a social welfare deciding officer decided that the relationship between him and the appellant was that he was engaged as an independent contractor. Mr. Walsh appealed that decision to an appeals officer who decided that he was, in effect, an employee of the appellant. On appeal to the chief appeals officer from that decision, pursuant to section 263 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993, the appellant requested an oral hearing which request was refused and it was determined that the decision of the appeals officer was not erroneous so as to require revision. It was from that decision that the appellant appealed to the High Court pursuant to section 271 of the Act of 1993 on two grounds: that the chief appeals officer failed to observe principles of natural and constitutional justice in refusing to hold an oral hearing for the purpose of taking evidence and/or receiving submissions, and; that he erred in refusing to review the said decision, given that it manifestly involved errors of law and unsustainable findings of fact, principally that the appeals officer ignored vital aspects of the relationship between the parties when reaching her decision.

Held by O’Donovan J in allowing the appeal that it was not mandatory for the chief appeals officer when conducting a review of a decision of an appeals officer to hold an oral hearing. However, when the grounds of appeal called for further inquiry by the chief appeals officer, the holding of an oral hearing to receive submissions with regard thereto was obligatory. Moreover, when, on an appeal, there were unresolved conflicts in evidence, a failure to hold an oral hearing which should have resolved such conflicts, would deprive the appellant of a fair hearing and offended principles of natural and constitutional justice.

That, when determining an appeal pursuant to section 271 of the Act of 1993, the court was not concerned with the reality of the relationship between the parties but was only concerned with whether, as a matter of law, the decision of the chief appeals officer was erroneous by reason of some mistake having been made in relation to the law or facts so as to require revision.

That, in the context of considering an application under section 263 of the Act of 1993, a chief appeals officer was the equivalent of an expert administrative tribunal and the court should, accordingly, be slow to interfere with his decision. However, when his conclusions were based on identifiable errors of law or unsustainable findings of fact, such conclusions had to be corrected.

That a finding of a decision-maker which ignores basic facts was an error of law. On that basis, the decision of the appeals officer was manifestly erroneous in law.

Accordingly, it was manifest that the chief appeals officer had failed to conduct a proper review of the decision of the appeals officer as he failed to resolve the majority of the issues raised by the appellant’s appeal and that had he done so, he could not have reasonably come to the conclusion that it was free from error.

Reporter: P.C.

1 JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Diarmuid B. O’Donovan delivered on the 7th day of November, 2003

2 This is an appeal by the appellant pursuant to s. 271 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1993 from a determination of the Chief Appeals Officer made on the 6th July, 2001, whereby it was determined that the decision of the Appeals Officer made on the 7th February, 2001 that Michael Walsh of Creagh Street, Glin in the County of Limerick was employed by the appellants in employment which is insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Act and, therefore, in effect, employed on a contract of service, was not erroneous, by reason of some mistake having been made in relation to the law or the facts, as to warrant revision pursuant to s. 263 of the said Act.

3 The background to these proceedings is that, by agreement in writing made on the 18th January, 1990 between the appellant, who operate an artificial insemination station, of the first part and the said Michael Walsh, who is an artificial inseminator by occupation, of the second part, the appellant engaged the services of the said Michael Walsh to provide an artificial insemination service on behalf of the said artificial insemination station within the area described in the said agreement and in accordance with the terms thereof. On the 5th May, 2000, on an application in that

4 behalf by the said Michael Walsh, a Social Welfare Deciding Officer decided that, for the purposes of the Social Welfare Acts, the relationship between the appellant and the said Michael Walsh with regard to the provision of artificial insemination services pursuant to the said agreement of the 18th January, 1990 was that Mr. Walsh operated as an independent contractor. In this regard, it would appear that that decision was consistent with decisions made by other Deciding Officers of the Department of Social Welfare based on precisely the same agreements as that of the 18th January, 1990 between the appellant and the said Michael Walsh. That as it may be, however, the said Michael Walsh, being dissatisfied with the said decision of the Deciding Officer, appealed that decision to the Appeals Officer. In this regard, it seems to me that the Appeals Officer was entitled to disregard previous decisions of other Deciding Officers with regard to the relationship inter se of parties to similar agreements to that which was the subject matter of the appeal to her and to determine that appeal solely in the light of any evidence which was presented to her and any submissions arising therefrom which might be made to her. In that regard, I know of no good reason why the Appeals Officer should be influenced by previous decisions of other Deciding Officers; no more than she was bound by the decision of the Deciding Officer which was the subject matter of the appeal to her and no one suggested to me that there might be such a reason.

5 The Appeals Officer’s determination of the appeal against the said decision of the Deciding Officer of the 5th May, 2000 was delivered on the 7th February, 2001 following an oral hearing before her on the 28th September, 2000 at which evidence was led on behalf of Mr. Walsh and on behalf of the appellant and submissions with regard to relevant law were made to her. In the light of that evidence and of those submissions, as I have already indicated, the Appeals Officer concluded that the

6 relationship between the appellant and Mr. Walsh was that of master/servant so that Mr. Walsh was employed under a contract of service. Being dissatisfied with that determination, the appellant applied to the Chief Appeals Officer pursuant to the provisions of s. 263 of the said Act of 1993 to revise the decision of the Appeals Officer on the grounds that it was erroneous by reason of both mistake in relation to the law and the facts. In this regard, it was suggested on behalf of the respondent, that, in the event that the appellant was dissatisfied with the said decision of the Appeals Officer, the appropriate remedy was for the appellant to apply to the Appeals Officer pursuant to the provisions of s. 262 of the said Act of 1993 to revise her decision. However, as I am satisfied that the appellant’s dissatisfaction with the said decision of the Appeals Officer of the 7th February, 2001 did not depend on new evidence, or new facts brought to her notice after the date of her decision, I think that it would have been inappropriate for the appellant to have applied to the Appeals Officer to revise her decision and that the only course open to it for the purpose of setting aside, reversing or otherwise interfering with the said decision was an application to the Chief Appeals Officer under the provisions of s. 263 of the said Act of 1993 to revise that decision. In that regard, when applying to the Chief Appeals Officer to revise the said decision of the Appeals Officer, the appellant specifically requested the Chief Appeals Officer to hold an oral hearing for the purpose of taking evidence and/or receiving submissions; a request to which the Chief Appeals Officer did not accede for the reason, as he stated “it does not seem to me, however, that such review procedure (i.e. a review to consider whether or not the decision of the Appeals...