Dornan Research and Development Ltd v Labour Court

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 13 May 1998
• Docket Number: [1997 No. 225 J.R.]
• Date: 13 May 1998
• Court: High Court

Dornan Research Development Ltd. v. Labour Court

Dornan Research and Development Limited

Applicant

and

The Labour Court and The Attorney General

Respondents

Marie Toye, Notice Party

[1997 No. 225 J.R.]

High Court

Constitution - Statute - Validity - Locus standi - Employment equality - Appeal under statute from determination of Labour Court on point of law only - Similar statute giving more extensive right of appeal - Whether limited appeal constitutional - Whether rights of appeal should be the same - Employment Equality Act, 1977 (No. 16), ss. 26 & 27 - Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 (No. 10), s. 10 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Articles 34.1, 40.1, 10.3.1 and 40.3.2.

The notice party was an employee of the applicant until 1996, when the employment terminated. In 1997, the notice party made a complaint to the first respondent of constructive dismissal against the applicant on the grounds of sexual harassment. That complaint was made to the first respondent under s. 27 of the Employment Equality Act, 1977. Section 27(2) provides that in such a case s. 26 should apply to the dispute as if the dispute were a complaint under that section.

Section 26(1)(e) provides that where an order is made under that sub-section an appeal lies to the High Court on a point of law. Section 26(5) provides that where compensation is directed under sub-s. 1 to be paid to a complainant the person to whom the direction is given may appeal against the order to the Circuit Court.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review challenging the constitutionality of s. 26(1)(e) on the ground, inter alia, that had the same claim been brought under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, the applicant would have a right of appeal to the Circuit Court on facts and law and a further appeal from the Circuit Court to the High Court.

Held by the High Court (Geoghegan J.), in refusing the relief sought, 1, that even if there was only an appeal on a point of law, the fact that one statute provided for a more extensive right of appeal than the other did not render it unconstitutional, as they dealt with different problems and could have different procedures; the fact that the two Acts could overlap did not have the effect that the two should provide identical procedures.

2. That, if the relief was granted, the effect would be to remove the right of appeal to the High Court, as the court could not direct the Oireachtas to enact amending legislation providing for wider rights of appeal.

There are no cases mentioned in this report.

Judicial review.

The facts have been summarised in the headnote and are fully set out in the judgment of Geoghegan J., infra.

On the 30th June, 1997, the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review by the High Court (Quirke J.).

Following the filing of...