Dornan v Labour Court Ireland

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Geoghegan
• Judgment Date: 13 May 1998
• Neutral Citation: [1998] IEHC 72
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: Record No. 225 J.R./1997
• Date: 13 May 1998

DORNAN v. LABOUR COURT IRELAND

JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN

DORNAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

APPLICANT

AND

THE LABOUR COURT IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEYGENERAL

RESPONDENTS

AND

MARIE TOYE

NOTICE PARTY

[1998] IEHC 72

Record No. 225 J.R./1997

THE HIGH COURT

Synopsis

Employment

Judicial review application; dismissal; sexual harassment; right of appeal; claim for compensation for constructive dismissal on the grounds of sexual harassment; whether the procedures for appealing a decision of the defendant to the Circuit Court and the High Court are unconstitututional; whether the difference between the appeal procedures under the Employment Equality Act, 1977 and the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 infringes the Constitution; ss. 26 & 27 Employment Equality Act, 1977; s. 10(4) Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 Held: Application for judicial review refused; appeal procedures constitutional (High Court: Geoghegan J.13/05/1998) Dornan Research and Development Limited v. The Labour Court - [2001] 1 IR 223

Citations:

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S26

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S27

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S26(1)(e)

CONSTITUTION ART 34.1

CONSTITUTION ART 40.1

CONSTITUTION ART 40.3.1

CONSTITUTION ART 40.3.2

UNFAIR DISMISSALS ACT 1977 S10(4)

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S27(2)

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S2(d)(i)

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S2(d)(iv)

EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1977 S26(5)

1 Judgment of Mr. Justice Geoghegandelivered the 13th day of May, 1998.

2 By Order of Mr. Justice Quirke made the 30th June, 1997, leave was granted to the Applicant to institute Judicial Review proceedings based on a statement of grounds which essentially made one complaint only, that is to say, that the First named Respondent, the Labour Court, had failed to require of the Notice Party and furnish on the Applicant detailed particulars as demanded by the Applicant arising out of an application for compensationlodged by the Notice Party against the Applicant under Sections 26 and 27 of the Employment Equality Act, 1977. However, at the hearing of the application for leave before Mr. Justice Quirke it appears that the Applicant sought to add an additional relief, namely, a declaration that the provisions of Section 26(1)(e) of the Employment Equality Act, 1977are unconstitutional, having regard to the provisions of Article 34.1 and Article 40.1 and Article 40.3.1 and 2 of the Constitution and adding the additional ground that by virtue of Section 26(1)(e) of the Employment Equality Act, 1977, the Applicant was deprived of its constitutional rights of access to the Courts and had been discriminated against on the alleged ground that Section 10(4) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977allowed an appeal to the Circuit Court and therefrom to the High Court in identical or similar circumstances whereas only limited rights of appeal were conferred by the Employment Equality Act, 1977. Leave was granted by Mr. Justice Quirke to deliver an amended statement of grounds adding in the additional relief and ground. As a question of the constitutional validity of a statutory provision now arises, the Attorney General is joined as a party.

3 In the events that have happened the non-constitutional grounds on which Judicial Review is sought no longer arise even for the purposes of determining the costs issue and in accordance with well established principles this Court should not embark on consideration of what is merely a moot. The original grounds of attack on the Labour Court procedures have become redundant because the written submission served by the Notice Party on the Labour Court and on the Applicant contains not just legal argument but a very detailed account indeed of the allegations grounding the compensation claim. It is not necessary to analyse the particulars sought originally by the Applicant. There is no doubt that insofar as the Applicant sought the names of witnesses it was not entitled to that information as that would never be the proper subject of a notice for particulars in civil proceedings in the High Court. But inrelation to any of the matters which would form the proper subject matter of a notice for particulars if the...