Gpa Group Plc v Bank of Ireland
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Hamilton C.J.,O'Flaherty J.,BLAYNEY J. |
| Judgment Date | 09 November 1995 |
| Neutral Citation | 1995 WJSC-SC 4604 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 09 November 1995 |
1995 WJSC-SC 4604
THE SUPREME COURT
HAMILTON C.J.
O'FLAHERTY J.
BLAYNEY J.
BETWEEN:
and
Citations:
RSC O.19 r28
O'NEILL V RYAN 1993 ILRM 557
K (D) V K (A) 1993 ILRM 710
BARRY V BUCKLEY 1981 IR 306
SUN FAT CHAN V OSSEOUS LTD 1992 1 IR 425
CIVIL AVIATION (ROUTE CHARGES FOR NAVIGATION SERVICES) REGS 1989 ART 11(a) UK
UNITED CITY MERCHANTS (INVESTMENTS) LTD V ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1983 1 AC 168
TRADAX (IRL) LTD V IRISH GRAIN BOARD 1984 IR 8
GPA V BANK OF IRELAND 1992 2 IR 408
Synopsis:
PRACTICE
Pleadings
Deletion - Defendant - Application - Dismissal - High Court - Inherent jurisdiction - Whether plaintiff's claim unsustainable - Security given by plaintiff for release of aircraft by defendant - Security by letter of credit issued by bank - Bank paid specified sum on demand by defendant - Payment alleged by plaintiff to be made in breach of contract between parties - Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986, order 19, r. 28 - (211/94 - Supreme Court - 9/11/95)
|G.P.A. Group Plc. v. Bank of Ireland|
Judgment delivered on the 9th day of November1995by Hamilton C.J.
This is an appeal brought by the second - named Defendant (hereinafter referred to as EUROCONTROL) against the judgment and order made by Mr. Justice Costello on the 2nd day of June, 1994.
As appears from the judgment of Costello J. (as he then was) the matter came before him by way of a motion brought by EUROCONTROL seeking to strike out the claim made on behalf of the Plaintiffs/Respondent(hereinafterreferred to as G.P.A.) pursuant to Order 19, Rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 and also pursuant to the Court's inherentjurisdiction.
Order 19, Rule 28 of the said Rules provide that:-
"the Court may order any pleading to be struck out, on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or answer and in any such case or in case of the action or defence being shown by the pleadings to be frivolous or vexatious, the Court may order the action to be stayed or dismissed, or judgment to be entered accordingly, as may be just."
With regard to the application before him, Costello J. statedthat:-
"It is manifest that the Plaintiff's statement of claim discloses a cause of action in contract and therefore cannot be struck out on the ground that it discloses no cause of action on itsface."
Having so found, he then went on to say that:-
"This application then turns on the courts own inherent jurisdiction. There is no controversy as to the extent of the court's jurisdiction or the general principles governing the exercise of this jurisdiction. The power is exercised inthe interests of justice. If it is quite clear that the Plaintiffs case is unsustainable, then it is wrong to allow the case to continue. However, the onus on the moving party is a very heavy one and the power to strike out should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. The courts discretion should be exercised in favour of the Plaintiff if such exceptional circumstances have not been established."
I do not think that such exceptional circumstances exist in theseproceedings."
In the course of his judgment in O'Neill .v. Ryan &Ors. (1993) ILRM page 557, O'Flaherty J. stated:-
"It is clear that the jurisdiction to strike out proceedings based on a consideration of the pleadings, without a full plenary hearing, should only be undertaken in a clear case; but once it is manifest that a Plaintiff cannot succeed on his pleadings in making out a case, the Court should say so. It is a jurisdiction necessary to be exercised on occasion to preserve a proper discipline in the conduct oflitigation."
In the course of his judgment in the same case, Blayney J. stated:-
"The second ground invokes an aspect of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court which wasdefined as follows recently by Costello J. in D.K. .v. A.K.,High Court, (1990) No. 5306P, 2nd October 1992;
The principles on which the Court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the Plaintiff's claim can be shortly stated. Basically, the jurisdiction exists to ensure that an abuse of the courts process does not take place. If it is established by satisfactory evidence that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or if it is clear that the Plaintiffs claim must fail then the court may stay the action. But it will only exercise this jurisdiction sparingly and in clear cases ( Barry .v. Buckley, [1981] I.R. 306: Sun Fat Chan .v. Osseous Ltd. [1992] 1 I.R. 425)."
Having expressed the view that the plaintiffs claims there were neither frivolous nor vexatious, Costello J. went on to say:-
"What I am required to consider therefore is whether any of the claims against all or any of the defendants is so clearly unsustainable that I should strike it out."
Having referred to these statements by Costello J., Blayney J. went on to say:-
"I am satisfied that this is a correct statementof the law. I am also satisfied that as in that case, the plaintiffs claim here against the last four defendants is neither frivolous nor vexatious so that what the Court has to determine is whether his claim against him is clearly unsustainable."
Consequently, it is quite clear that a statement of claim cannot be struck out pursuant to the provisions of Order 19, Rule 28 unless it discloses no reasonable cause of action, or by the Court, acting in pursuance of its inherent jurisdiction unless the claim is either frivolous, vexatious, or so clearly unsustainable as to be doomed tofailure.
There is no suggestion in this case that G.P.A.'s claim in these proceedings is either frivolous or vexatious. Consequently, it can only be struck out if the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action or that the claim made on behalf of G.P.A. is clearlyunsustainable.
In this case G.P.A. claimed damages against the EUROCONTROL for breach of an agreement alleged to have been entered into between them on the 20th July 1989.
The background to the Agreement and the alleged terms thereof are set forth in the Statement of Claim as follows:-
2 "4. During 1986 and 1987 a subsidiary of the plaintiff, Guinness Peat Aviation (Belgium) N.V. ("GPAB") leased inter alia five Boeing 737 aircraft to a Spanish airline company called Hispania Lineas Aereas S.A. (hereinafter "Hispania"). Prior to the 15th July 1989 Hispania defaulted on its obligations to GPAB under the leases for the said aircraft. On or about the 15th July 1989 the plaintiff repossessed the said aircraft pursuant to an order of the Courts of England and Wales. On or about the 17th July 1989 the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority ("CAA") detained the said five aircraft then in various United Kingdom airports pursuant to Article 11 (a) of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation (Route Charges for Navigation Services) Regulations 1989 for alleged non - payment of route charges due to the second named defendant.
5. Immediately thereafter the plaintiff commenced negotiations with the second named defendant for the release of the said aircraft. At all material times the plaintiff contended that the route charges were due (if due at all) by the then operator of the aircraft, Hispania and not by the plaintiff as owner or lessor of the aircraft.
6. At all material times in the negotiations between the plaintiff and the second named defendant culminating in the agreement of the 20th July 1989 referred to hereafter, the plaintiff acted for and on behalf of the companies within the plaintiff's group which had an interest as owner or lessor of the said aircraft.
7. For the purpose of obtaining the release of the said aircraft pending a resolution of the dispute as to any liability of the plaintiff to the second named defendant for the route charges of the said aircraft the plaintiff and second named defendant entered into an agreement on or about the 20th July1989 which said agreement was partly reduced to writing.
8. It was an express or in the alternative an implied term of the said agreement of the 20th July 1989 between the plaintiff and the second named defendant that:
(i) The second named defendant would direct the CAA to release the said aircraft upon the provision by the plaintiff of the agreed security; and
(ii) the agreed security was a letter of credit to be applied for by the plaintiff for the benefit of the second named defendant in the sum of US$3 million whereby the issuing bank would pay upon presentation of a demand certificate in either of the following forms:
a A. "the undersigned are authorised officers of GPA Group Ltd. and EUROCONTROL. We hereby instruct you to transfer US$ (amount claimed) to Account No. immediately with telex confirmation of suchpayment"
b B. "the undersigned are authorised officers of EUROCONTROL. We hereby attach a final and binding order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the amount claimed andtime for appeal shall have passed. We hereby instruct you to transfer US$ (amount claimed) to account no. ( ) immediately with telex confirmation of such payment"; and
(iii) The final order of a court of competent jurisdiction was an order against the plaintiff in favour of the second named defendant for the route charges claimed in respect of the said five aircraft; and
(iv) the second named defendant would not present to any bank to whom such letter of credit was issued a demand for payment unless such demand was signed on behalf of the plaintiff or had attached thereto a final order of a court of competent jurisdiction against the plaintiff in favour of the second named defendant for the said route charges claimed by the second named defendant in...
To continue reading
Request your trial