McLoughlin v Murray Senior

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Heslin
• Judgment Date: 30 September 2022
• Neutral Citation: [2022] IEHC 537
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2021 160 MCA]

Between

Catherine McLoughlin

Applicant

and

Dr. Diarmuid Murray Senior

Respondents

[2022] IEHC 537

[2021 160 MCA]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Unfair dismissal – Extension of time – Statutory interpretation – Appellant appealing on a point of law against a decision of the Labour Court – Whether the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in its interpretation of the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Commission Act 2015

Facts: The appellant, Ms McLoughlin, by originating motion dated 8 July 2021, applied to the High Court by way of an appeal on a point of law against a decision of the Labour Court dated 3 June 2021. The respondent, Dr Murray, was a party to the proceedings in circumstances where the Labour Court was not obliged to participate. The following reliefs were sought in the said motion: (1) an order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the Workplace Relations Commission Act 2015 appealing the decision on the grounds that the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in its interpretation of the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44(4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal in a claim for unfair dismissal; (2) an order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the 2015 Act appealing the decision on the grounds that the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in its application of the facts at issue in this case to the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44(4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal from the Workplace Relations Commission to the Labour Court in an unfair dismissals claim; (3) an order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the 2015 Act appealing the decision of the Labour Court on the grounds that it erred in fact and in law in its approach to the hearing in the matter as to the meaning and application of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44(4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal in a claim for unfair dismissal; (4) an order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the 2015 Act appealing, on a point of law, the Labour Court’s decision on the grounds that the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in failing to hear all of the available evidence and consider all of the circumstances relevant to the meaning and application of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44 4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal in a claim for unfair dismissal; and (5) an order remitting the matter back to the Labour Court for a rehearing.

Held by Heslin J that the Labour Court correctly applied the law and, in so doing, held that the appellant had failed to meet the necessary standard of proof, having regard to the facts upon which the assertion of “exceptional circumstances” was made. Heslin J found that this was no laying down of the wrong test by the Labour Court, but an application of the right test, which test the applicant failed to meet in the Labour Court’s view, which was lawfully reached on the evidence which was before it. Heslin J regarded himself as bound to accept the facts as found by the Labour Court in circumstances where it made no error. Heslin J said this having examined the evidence which was before the Labour Court and the basis upon which it made its decision, which disclosed no error. Heslin J held that there was no question of the Labour Court relying on inadmissible evidence as a basis for the decision. Similarly, Heslin J held that there was no question of the Labour Court having refused to hear probative and admissible evidence.

Heslin J dismissed the appellant’s motion in circumstances where it had not been established that the Labour Court erred in law and, thus, the High Court had no basis to disturb the determination made by the Labour Court. Heslin J’s preliminary view was that the ‘normal’ rule that ‘costs’ should ‘follow the event’ applied.

Motion dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Heslin delivered on the 30 ^th day of September, 2022

Introduction

1 . By originating motion dated 8 July 2021 (“the motion”) Ms Catherine McLoughlin (“the appellant”) applied to this court by way of an appeal on a point of law against a decision of the Labour Court dated 3 June 2021 (“the decision”). The respondent is a party to the proceedings in circumstances where the Labour Court is not obliged to participate.

2 . The following reliefs were sought in the said motion:-

• 1. An order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the Workplace Relations Commission Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) appealing the decision on the grounds that the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in its interpretation of the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s.44(4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal in a claim for unfair dismissal;

• 2. An order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the 2015 Act appealing the decision on the grounds that the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in its application of the facts at issue in this case to the meaning of “ exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44 (4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal from the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) to the Labour Court in an unfair dismissals claim;

• 3. An order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the 2015 Act appealing the decision of the Labour Court on the grounds that it erred in fact and in law in its approach to the hearing in this matter as to the meaning and application of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44 (4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal in a claim for unfair dismissal;

• 4. An order pursuant to the provisions of s. 46 of the 2015 Act appealing, on a point of law, the Labour Court's decision on the grounds that the Labour Court erred in fact and in law in failing to hear all of the available evidence and consider all of the circumstances relevant to the meaning and application of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 44 (4) of the 2015 Act for the purpose of extending time to maintain an appeal in a claim for unfair dismissal;

• 5. An order remitting the matter back to the Labour Court for a rehearing.

Oral and written submissions

3 . As I did at the conclusion of the hearing, I want to express my thanks to Ms McVeigh BL for the appellant and to Ms Ruigrock BL for the respondent, who made oral submissions with clarity and skill which were of great assistance to the Court. Shortly before the hearing, written legal submissions, dated 14 June 2022, were furnished on behalf of the respondent. I declined an adjournment request which was made on behalf of the applicant, but, in addition to affording time on the day of the hearing so that the appellant's Counsel could consider those submissions, I took the view that there would be no risk of injustice to allow the appellant to furnish legal submissions, in writing, after the conclusion of the hearing, within a set time-limit, with an opportunity for any responding submission within a fixed period. Counsel agreed two weeks and two weeks, respectively, for the exchange of written legal submissions post the hearing. Written submissions dated 29 June 2022 were received from the appellant and written submission dated 14 July 2022 were received from the respondent. These were also of assistance to the court and I wish to express my thanks to both counsel and their instructing solicitors. I have carefully considered all submissions both written and oral and, during this judgement, I will make reference to the principal submissions and authorities which were put to the Court.

S. 44 of the 2015 Act

4 . It is appropriate at this point to set out the sections referred to in the appellant's motion and to highlight certain subsections which featured most during the hearing. Under the heading “Appeal to Labour Court from decision of adjudication officer”, s. 44 of the 2014 Act begins as follows:

“44. (1) (a) A party to proceedings under section 41 may appeal a decision of an adjudication officer given in those proceedings to the Labour Court and, where the party does so, the Labour Court shall—

(i) give the parties to the appeal an opportunity to be heard by it and to present to it any evidence relevant to the appeal ,

(ii) make a decision in relation to the appeal in accordance with the relevant redress provision, and

(iii) give the parties to the appeal a copy of that decision in writing.

(b) In this subsection “relevant redress provision” means—

(i) in relation to an appeal from a decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 relating to a complaint under that section of a contravention of a provision of an enactment specified in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 5, the provision of that enactment specified in Part 2 of Schedule 6,

(ii) in relation to an appeal from a decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 relating to a dispute as to the entitlements of an employee under an enactment specified in Part 3 of Schedule 5, the provision of that enactment specified in Part 2 of Schedule 6 and

(iii) in relation to an appeal from a decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 relating to a complaint under subsection (3) of that section, paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Act of 2012.

(2) An appeal under this section shall be initiated by the party concerned giving a notice in writing to the Labour Court containing such particulars as are determined by the Labour Court in accordance with rules under subsection (5) of section 20 of the Act of 1946 and stating that the party concerned is appealing the decision to which it relates.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), a notice under subsection (2) shall be given to the Labour Court not later than 42...